

Australia and Japan's Admission into the United Nations, 1952-1956: Reconsideration of Its Implications for Australia-Japan Relations

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Abstract: In December 1956, Japan was welcomed to the United Nations. This was a crucial moment not only for Japan but also for Australia which consistently supported Japan's candidature. Drawing upon archival sources of both Australia and Japan, this article examines Australia's role in the process leading up to this moment and how an issue of Japan's accession to the United Nations came to influence the bilateral relationship. The article consists of four sections. It begins with an examination of the period from 1952 to 1954, showing that the Australian government reluctantly supported Japan's association with the United Nations, but was unwilling to take initiatives to bring Japan into the organization. As explained in the second section, the situation changed in late 1955 when Australia decided to actively support Japan's admission into the United Nations. Japan's attempt to join the organization in this year was unsuccessful, but Australia's activism started to influence Japanese policymakers. The last two sections of this article are concerned with developments in 1956, with the third section illuminating how Canberra assisted Tokyo's campaign in the first half of that year. This section indicates that although this assistance contributed to greater mutual trust between Australia and Japan, these two countries had a substantial disagreement over the Afro-Asian group. This international grouping was becoming increasingly important in the United Nations and therefore it was of high significance for Japan's campaign to join the organization. The Australia-Japan disagreement was exposed in the wake of the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Australia came to see Japan as a member of the Afro-Asian group unwilling to oppose its other members. This tension is explored in the last section of this article. The issue of Japan's admission into the United Nations enhanced mutual confidence between Australia and Japan, but ended up raising a new concern within the Australian government about Japan's role in the Afro-Asian group and the implications for Japan's international orientation.

Introduction

In December 1956, Japan joined the United Nations (hereafter the UN), marking a significant milestone in its return to international society. According to Suemitsu Kadowaki, the Japanese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan's accession to this organization was a memorable occasion, as it signified Japan's complete return to international society.¹ This was a crucial moment not only for Tokyo but also for Canberra which explicitly supported Japan's candidature. The purpose of this article is to investigate Australia's role in a process leading up to this moment and how the issue of Japan's admission into the UN played out within Australia-Japan relations.

Australia's support for Japan's entrance into the UN is noted by historians who are interested in Australia-Japan relations shortly after World War II (hereafter WWII). However, they barely mention this support as an example of Australia's softening attitude towards post-WWII Japan, as their attention was centred on trade relations between the two countries whose growth was facilitated by the Commerce Agreement signed in July 1957.² Seeing this agreement as a historic milestone, they hardly illuminate Australia's role within a process through which Japan entered the UN and the implications of this process

¹ Suemitsu Kadowaki, 'Kokusai Rengo to Nihon no Yakuwari', *Sekai Shuho*, Vol. 38, 1 (1957), p. 24.

² As to concentration of scholarly attention on trade relations, see Michael Heazle and Dan Halvorson, 'Introduction', in Dan Halvorson and Michael Heazle eds., *The politics behind the story: Sixty years on from the 1957 Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement* (Nathan: Griffith Asia Institute, 2018), p. 6.

for broader relations between the two countries.³ An exception can be found in Rix's comprehensive survey of Australia-Japan political relations after 1952. His survey's reference to Japan's admission into the UN is quite brief and not corroborated by Japanese archives, although he provides an overview of the Australian government's intention.⁴ Drawing on archival sources in both Australia and Japan, this article elevates the significance of Japan's admission into the UN for Australia-Japan relations.

This article is made up of following four sections. The first section sets the scene by exploring the Australian government's attitude towards Japan's admission into the UN from 1952 to 1954. It indicates that the Australians felt that they were obliged to support the former enemy's candidature, but they were unwilling to take initiatives to bring Japan into the UN. It is followed by a section about Japan's failure to join the UN in 1955. This section also examines the motivations of both Tokyo and Canberra to bounce back from this failure. The third section illuminates how Australia tried to help Japan's campaign especially in the first half of 1956. The emergence of the Afro-Asian group as a factor in Japan's campaign is also analysed, revealing substantial disagreement between Australia and Japan on this international grouping. Lastly, this article considers the impact of the Suez Crisis on Japan's strategy to join the UN and Australia's perception of this. The article also traces the rise in the Afro-Asian group's importance for Japan's bid for the UN membership, indicating that, within the Australian foreign policy circles, the idea of viewing Japan as a member of the Afro-Asian group was growing.

A Reluctant Supporter, 1952-1954

On 28 April 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect and Japan returned to international society as a sovereign nation. Preamble of this treaty explicitly stated that Japan was willing to join the UN and to observe principles enunciated by the UN Charter.⁵ Hence, after restoring its independence, the Japanese government promptly applied to the UN Secretary-General for the country's membership of the UN.⁶

This application could be a complicating matter for the Australian government. Australia was one of the signatories of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. According to the treaty's preamble, the Allied Powers which emerged victorious in WWII were expected to welcome Japan's willingness to join the UN. Australia was no exception. However, there was strong hostility towards Japan within Australia, mainly because of Japan's maltreatment of Australian Prisoners of War. The Australian policymakers were well aware of this sentiment. The Department of External Affairs considered that the Australian public would want to minimize their contacts with the Japanese people.⁸

However, the Australian government decided to support Japan's admission into the UN as early as mid-1952. On 1 July 1952, Canberra authorized Edward Ronald Walker, the first post-WWII Australian Ambassador to Japan, to convey this support to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Walker followed this instruction on 10 July. Richard Gardiner Casey, the

³ Takashi Terada, 'The Evolution of the Australia-Japan Relations in 1945-80: Building Foundations for the Partnership in Asia Pacific Regionalism', *The Doshisha law review*, Vol. 58, 4 (2006), p. 22; James Llewelyn, David Walton and Gen Kikkawa, *A Pacifist State in a Hostile Region: Japan and Post-war Conflict in Southeast Asia* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009), p. 24; David Walton, *Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia: early post-war initiatives in regional diplomacy* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2012), p. 31.

⁴ Alan Rix, *The Australia-Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the present* (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 120-121.

⁵ For the text of preamble of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, see Heiwa Jyoyaku (Zenbun), 8 September 1951, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ed., *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019), p. 6.

⁶ Okazaki to Lie, 16 June 1952, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 45-48.

⁷ Heiwa Jyoyaku (Zenbun), 8 September 1951, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, p. 6.

⁸ Note by Department of External Affairs, [August] 1952, in David Lowe and Daniel Oakman eds., *Australia and the Colombo Plan, 1949-1957: Documents on Australian Foreign Policy* (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004), p. 485. On a problem of Australian Prisoners of War captured by Japan during WWII and Australia's anti-Japanese sentiment immediately after WWII, see Dean Askielowicz, *The Australian pursuit of Japanese war criminals, 1943-1957: from foe to friend* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017).

⁹ External Affairs to Australian Ambassador in Tokyo, 1 July 1952, National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA) A9564, 223/1 Part 1; First Division, Bureau for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Waga Kuni Kokuren Kamei ni taisuru Osutoraria no Taido', 15 June 1956, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (hereafter Diplomatic Archives of Japan), B'-0042.

Australian Minister for External Affairs from 1951 to 1960, also expressed this position, stating that Australia would support Japan's candidature if it was recommended by the United States.¹⁰ The fact that Casey mentioned the United States gives an important indication of the position which Japan internationally found itself in. Like Australia which signed a tripartite security pact with New Zealand and the United States, Japan concluded the Japan-United States Security Treaty immediately after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, becoming a formal ally of the United States. In short, Japan re-entered international society in a way that incorporated the country into the Western camp of the Cold War. As a result, Japan became Australia's indirect ally, a factor that the Australian government had to consider in its dealings with the former foe.

But, it was primarily because of this international position that Japan could not enter the UN until December 1956. In the General Assembly session of 1952, Japan's bid to join the organization failed because the Soviet Union, unhappy with Japan's membership of the Western camp, exercised its veto power.¹¹ After this unsuccessful attempt, a resolution was submitted to General Assembly approving Japan's eligibility for joining the UN. Australia voted in favour of this resolution. Percy Spender, the Australian envoy to the United States and former Minister for External Affairs, promised to support the resolution, despite his persistent distrust of Japan which stemmed from its actions during WWII.¹² The failure in 1952 did not alter Australia's attitude. After 1952, Australia consistently supported Japan's attempt to join the UN.

Despite this consistent support, the Australian government was not particularly keen to see Japan's admission into the UN. According to the Department of External Affairs' paper endorsed by its Acting Secretary, Australia promised to support Japan's candidature, primarily because 'it would seem that Australia and other signatories of the Peace Treaty are bound by the terms of the Peace Treaty to support any Japanese move' to enter the UN.¹³ But, the Australian officials insisted in the same paper that each application for the UN membership 'should be considered on its individual merits, in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter'. In short, Australia was unwilling to support a political solution of the UN membership issue which meant 'a blanket approval [...] covering all Soviet – and Western – sponsored candidates', although Moscow's intransigence practically made this the only way for bringing Japan into the UN.¹⁴ The Australian officials also argued against giving special treatment to Japan. They justified this position by writing that if Japan was prioritized, this may cause dissatisfaction of other countries wishing to join the UN such as Ceylon and Ireland.¹⁵ Thus, Australia denied both the only feasible way of realizing Japan's admission into the UN and giving priority to Japan's case, suggesting that Canberra did not have any desire to quickly bring the former enemy into the UN. It was merely because of the obligation stemming from the San Francisco Peace Treaty that Australia supported Japan's bid to join the UN. While the Soviet Union was repeatedly rejecting Japan's admission into the UN from 1952 to 1954, the United States and Japan came up with various proposals regarding this issue. However, there was no evidence suggesting that Australia responded to these proposals.¹⁶

On the other hand, the Japanese government did not expect a lot from its Australian counterpart in terms of its entrance into the UN. Although Katsuo Okazaki, the then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, publicly expressed his government's

¹⁰ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Evening Edition, 1 September 1952, p. 1.

¹¹ The Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty and diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were not restored until late 1956.

¹² First Division, Bureau for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Waga Kuni Kokuren Kamei ni taisuru Osutoraria no Taido', 15 June 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042; Takeuchi to Okazaki, 12 December 1952, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, p. 107. On Spender's distrust of Japan, see David Lowe, *Australian Between Empires: the Life of Percy Spender* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2010), pp. 137-138.

¹³ External Affairs, 'Japan's Application for Admission to the U.N.', n.d., NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 1. This document was sent to the Australian mission to the UN on 24 June 1952. Endorsement of the Acting Secretary was given on that occasion. See External Affairs to Australian Permanent Representative at the UN, 24 June 1952, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 1.

¹⁴ External Affairs, 'Japan's Application for Admission to the U.N.', n.d., NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ On these proposals, see Liang Pan, *The United Nations in Japan's Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-1992: National Security, Party Politics, and International Status* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), pp. 254-272.

gratitude for Australia's support,¹⁷ the Japanese internally had mixed views about Australia's intention with regard to this issue. As Okazaki wrote to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington in early December 1952, Australia was included in a list of countries which Tokyo considered requesting to submit the resolution approving Japan's eligibility for becoming a member of the UN.¹⁸ This reference to Australia was a logical extension of the fact that Australia in November 1949 had submitted a similar resolution approving eligibility of nine countries for joining the UN and asking the Security Council to reconsider this matter. However, the Japanese officials who were in charge of the UN diplomacy wrote that even if they requested Australia to submit this request, the Australian government may reject it.¹⁹ In this way, being briefed on strong hostility towards Japan within Australia,²⁰ the Japanese government was unsure about how much it would be able to expect from the Australians and could not count on Australia's active cooperation. Australia was not important in Japan's strategy to achieve the UN membership and Australia's consistent support for Japan's candidature did not have significant ripple effect over broader Australia-Japan relations at this stage.

The 1955 Fiasco

This situation changed in the latter half of 1955 when this issue became the focus of Australia-Japan relations. As the General Assembly session of this year approached, the Australian government drastically altered its position on the UN membership issue. Canberra became 'favourably inclined to the idea of admitting a large number of applicants both non Communist and Communist at the coming session of the General Assembly'.²¹ This change was confirmed by Casey who made clear at the Australian Parliament that Australia would welcome admission of all countries applying for the UN membership including so-called Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. The only exception was the People's Republic of China. In this way, Australia's position on the UN membership issue saw a fundamental shift shortly before the 1955 General Assembly session, with Canberra embracing political solution of this issue as a package including all candidates excepting Beijing.

In this shift, Japan was of particular significance. Speaking at the General Assembly session of 1955, Casey specifically pointed to an improvement in Australia-Japan relations since April 1952, Japan's participation in international agencies, and rules-based management of the pearl fishery dispute, symbolizing the Australian government's increasing confidence in Japan. In this speech, he declared that 'Australia has recently assured Japan of full support in connection with her admission to the United Nations'.²³ This special reference showed that the Australian government attached special importance to Japan within a reservoir of countries wishing to join the UN, representing a departure from its traditional attitude based on the assumption that Japan should not be prioritized. This change took place against the background of the Cabinet Decision in August 1954. This decision, which was designed to keep Japan within the Western camp of the Cold War, stipulated that Australia should join forces with other Western countries, namely the United States and United Kingdom, for helping Japan to foster its links with these countries and to build its ability to live without relying on its trade with mainland China. This decision had already been applied to Australia's support for Japan's successful entrance into the Colombo Plan as a donor country in October 1954.²⁴ Australia's explicit support for Japan's admission into the UN was its logical extension.

¹⁷ *The Argus*, 26 January 1954, p. 4.

¹⁸ Okazaki to Araki, 6 December 1952, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, p. 96.

¹⁹ First Division, Bureau for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Kokuren Sokai ni taisuru Nihon no Kokuren Kamei Shikaku Shonin Ketsugian Teishutsu ni suite no Kosatsu', in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 89-90.

²⁰ The Japanese Embassy in Canberra provided on-the-spot reports on anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia. For example, see Nishi to Okazaki, 30 March 1953, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0127; Nishi to Okazaki, 23 April 1953, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0127.

²¹ External Affairs to Australian Embassy in Tokyo, 20 August 1955, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 1.

²² *Canberra Times*, 31 August 1955, p. 1.

²³ R. G. Casey diaries, 23 September 1955, MS6150, Vol. 19, box 28, National Library of Australia (hereafter NLA).

²⁴ Cabinet Minute, Prime Minister's Committee, 17 August 1954, NAA A4912, 2.

²⁵ For an account of Australia's attitude towards Japan's admission into the Colombo Plan, see Ai Kobayashi, 'Australia and Japan's Admission into the Colombo Plan', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 60, 4 (2014), pp. 518-533.

Casey's reference to Japan immediately captured the Japanese government's attention. Tadakatsu Suzuki, the Japanese Ambassador in Canberra since August 1955, conveyed his government's appreciation of this reference.²⁶ Toshikazu Kase, who became the Japanese observer at the UN in July 1955, praised this reference, too. In his internal dispatch, he wrote to Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs from December 1954 to December 1956, that Casey forcefully supported Japan's admission and made a profound impression on the floor.²⁷ In short, Casey succeeded in impressing strength of Australia's support for Japan's bid to join the UN on the Japanese policymakers, preparing the ground for Tokyo to incorporate Australia into its campaign strategy.

In fact, most of the delegates participating in the 1955 General Assembly session touched on the issue of new members' admission into the UN. This overwhelming attention being paid to the issue heightened international momentum towards its resolution.²⁸ Against this background, Australia supported Canada's proposal that eighteen applicant states including Japan would simultaneously join the UN. In October 1955, this proposal was distributed to pro-Western delegations, including Australia. Thereafter, Australia, along with Canada and Ceylon, put pressure on the United Kingdom to agree to the proposal. Whitehall yielded to the pressure and the proposal was formally announced in the General Assembly on 10 November.²⁹ Australia became one of 25 countries that co-sponsored a resolution based on the Canadian proposal.³⁰ Tokyo's policy was to encourage adoption of the proposal and to pressure Moscow to accept it. The Soviet Union had been intermittently engaging in bilateral negotiations with Japan on various matters including Japan's UN membership since early 1955.³¹ Moscow accepted the Japanese demand, because the Soviet Union could secure UN membership for its five satellites in return for accepting Japan and Spain into the UN. Washington also accepted in principle the Canadian proposal. But, the American officials felt it was difficult to accept UN membership of the Mongolian People's Republic (hereafter Outer Mongolia), the world's second oldest Socialist country, which was included in the proposal. It was because the Republic of China, exiled from mainland, insisted that it was a territory illegally separated by the Soviet Union from China. But, they eventually acceded to the proposal.³²

It was the inclusion of Outer Mongolia that wrecked the entire project of Japan's admission into the UN. On December 13, the Republic of China exercised its veto power on the Canadian proposal because of the inclusion of Outer Mongolia. Taipei was so intransigent that even Washington could not persuade it to shift, causing Moscow's retaliatory action. However, the Soviet representative proposed that sixteen countries which excluded Outer Mongolia and Japan from the original proposal should be admitted into the UN the following day. This hastily arranged proposal was adopted by the UN Security Council. As a result, Japan's campaign was again unsuccessful in 1955.³³ As Walker aptly put it, Japan 'found herself left out in the cold with [...] Outer Mongolia'.³⁴

This failure caused a great deal of disappointment in Japan which was apparent to the Australian Embassy in Tokyo.

²⁶ Record of Conversation between Suzuki and Tange, 19 October 1955, NAAA1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4.

²⁷ Kase to Shigemitsu, 23 September 1955, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, p. 230.

²⁸ Shuji Taneine, 'Gaimusho to Nihon no Kokuren Kamei Gaiko: Beiso Reisen no Hazama de', in Minoru Hagihara and Shinya Ito eds., *Kindai Nihon no Taigai Ninshiki*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2017), p. 352.

²⁹ Kaoru Kurusu, 'Japan's struggle for UN membership in 1955', in Makoto Iokibe, Caroline Rose, Junko Tomaru, and John Weste eds., *Japanese diplomacy in the 1950s: from isolation to integration* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 117, 120; Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Secretary of State, 24 August 1955, in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957*, Vol. XI: *United Nations and General International Matters* (Washington: United States Government Publishing Office, 1988), p. 294.

³⁰ Telegram from the Mission at the UN to the Department of State, 16 November 1955, in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957*, Vol. XI: *United Nations and General International Matters*, p. 369.

³¹ Other matters raised in Japan-Soviet Union negotiations included Japanese detainees held by the Soviet Union, fishery, and territorial dispute in southern part of the Kuril Islands.

³² Toshikazu Inoue, 'Kokuren to Sengo Nihon Gaiko: Kokuren Kamei heno Michi, 1945-56 Nen', in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai ed., *Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu 16: Sengo Gaiko no Keisei* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994), pp. 203-205; Kurusu, 'Japan's struggle for UN membership in 1955', pp. 118-120; Pan, *The United Nations in Japan's Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-1992*, pp. 276-278.

³³ Taneine, 'Gaimusho to Nihon no Kokuren Kamei Gaiko', pp. 353-355. For an account of Taipei's attitude, see Kurusu, 'Japan's struggle for UN membership in 1955', pp. 123-127.

³⁴ Australian Permanent Representative at the UN to External Affairs, 'Japan's Foreign Policy', 7 February 1956, NAAA1838, 476/1/1/3 Part 2.

Moreover, the fact that Japan was bracketed with Outer Mongolia greatly offended Japanese sensibilities.³⁵ According to the Embassy's officials, while the Soviet Union and the Republic of China were thought to be chiefly responsible for the failure, some Japanese considered that it was the United States that should be blamed for the failure. Kase, who was in charge of Japan's campaign in New York, even expressed Japan's disappointment at the unreliable United States in front of the American officials. It was undeniable that Japan was suspicious of Washington's true intent. Furthermore, the failure led to accusations that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was too optimistic about the prospect of the Canadian proposal. Ichiro Hatoyama, the Japanese Prime Minister at that time, pointed to the ministry's excessive optimism, although the Embassy did not agree with his assessment.³⁶

In these circumstances, the besieged ministry frankly admitted that Japan's campaign to gain the UN membership in 1956 would be even more difficult than in 1955. For example, in late January 1956, the Japanese Ambassador to France surmised that, as reduction in the number of candidates would decrease other countries' interests in this issue, Japan's accession to the UN would be harder to achieve than the previous year. This viewpoint was brought to Australia via Suzuki. He told a senior Australian official that Japan's accession unfortunately appeared deadlocked and something major would be required in order to break that. Despite their admission of the adverse circumstances, the Japanese officials were determined to make renewed efforts in 1956 by utilizing every available opportunity. They generally agreed that the problem of Japan's admission into the UN should not be abandoned and that they would have to take all possible measures to solve this problem.³⁷

The Australian government did not have any reason for withdrawing its support for Japan's candidature and was quick to reaffirm it. On 17 December 1955, Canberra instructed Walker, whose transfer to New York as the Australian Permanent Representative at the UN was announced the day before, to convey to Shigemitsu Australia's sympathy for Japan's continued exclusion from the UN and desire to see an immediate end to this exclusion. Shigemitsu expressed his gratitude.³⁸ What were the Australian government's aims behind this initiative? This was revealed to a significant extent by a long letter Casey sent to Robert Gordon Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister from December 1949 to January 1966. In this letter, the Minister for External Affairs examined the possible consequences of Japan's exclusion from the UN by writing that:

there appeared to be a fairly strong local feeling that the United States and the other free nations, with whom Japan is committed, had not supported Japan's case as strongly as they might. Japan feels most keenly her present situation as a second-rate power and an unequal partner in the Western bloc. Admission to the United Nations would restore to the Japanese a great deal of lost national pride and would, I think, tend to tighten the ties at present linking her to the West. Continued failure to gain admission would appear, on the other hand, to have the dangerous effect of forcing the Japanese, in their frustration, to look elsewhere for a means of national reassertion and would encourage, at the best, a drift towards neutralism or, at the worst, increased flirtation with the Communist

³⁵ *Ibid.*; Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, 'Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960', in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Anne Westad eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 261.

³⁶ Extract Sitrep no 50, 15 December 1955, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 1; Extract Sitrep no 51, 22 December 1955, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 1; Pan, *The United Nations in Japan's Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-1992*, pp. 281-282.

³⁷ Nishimura to Shigemitsu, 24 January 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 447-450; Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 10 May 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0144.

³⁸ Canberra to Australian Embassy in Tokyo, 17 December 1955, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4; Australian Embassy in Tokyo to Minister for External Affairs, 21 December 1955, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4. As to Walker's new appointment, see *Canberra Times*, 17 December 1955, p. 2.

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In other words, Australian's active support for Japan's admission was based on and justified by its desire to keep Japan within the Western camp of the Cold War by healing the wound to Japan's national pride. This clearly represented the continuity of thinking with the Cabinet Decision in August 1954. However, it should be noted that Casey also acknowledged that there were several issues in Australia-Japan relations that were more important than Japan's entry into the UN.⁴⁰ Importantly, some of these issues such as Japanese immigration to Australia, trade and the pearl fishery dispute were expected to require tough negotiations involving not only Tokyo but also other departments and the State governments. Therefore, earning credits from Japan by making use of Japan's admission into the UN, a relatively minor matter, was probably sensible tactics for the Australian government, in the bigger picture of Australia-Japan relations. The tactics may have been supported by Kase's remark that Australia's support for the Japanese admission was the strongest factor contributing to further improvement in Australia-Japan relations.⁴¹

It is hard to determine whether the Japanese government was completely aware of these Australian aims. For example, on 8 May 1956, Suzuki observed that the Australian policymakers thought that it would contribute to Australia's safety if Japan was drawn closer to the Western camp by its accession to the UN, but he did not refer to the fact that the importance of this issue may not necessarily be great for Australia.⁴² However, noting Australia's repeated expressions of support, Tokyo certainly recognized Canberra's unswerving support and saw Canberra as a dependable ally, especially as Australia was elected to sit as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.⁴³ On 20 February, Kase noted that Walker's eagerness to bring Japan into the UN might be greater than that of his British and American colleagues. Kase went on to state that the Australian representative's attitude was encouraging to Japan, indicating the Japanese government's appreciation for Australia's support.⁴⁴

Assistance for Japan's Admission into the UN and Disagreement over the Afro-Asian Group

Based on the above-mentioned recognition, the Japanese government in 1956 was confident about Australia's activism unlike in 1952-1955. This confidence led Tokyo to incorporate Australia's support into its campaign strategy in the following two ways: namely Australia's non-permanent membership of the Security Council and Australia's status as a principal member of the Commonwealth. Firstly, towards the end of May 1956, Kase suggested to Walker that it may be appropriate and acceptable for all parties concerned for Australia, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, to sponsor Japan's candidature. This suggestion was based upon his understanding of Walker's eagerness, Britain's favourable attitude towards Australia's initiative and the tendency of the United States and Soviet Union to compete over initiatives in convening the Security Council's meeting for admitting new member states. Walker checked with Canberra, adding a positive note that if Australia took the initiative, it would enjoy favourable reception within Japan.⁴⁵ Casey was interested in this idea and consulted with Alan Watt, a senior Australian diplomat who had recently arrived in Tokyo as the Australian Ambassador. On 8 June, Watt proposed that he would inform the Japanese officials that Australia was considering taking the initiative in the Security Council after July 1956.⁴⁶ This proposal was swiftly put into practice. On 18 June, he told Shigemitsu that Australia was prepared to

³⁹ Minister for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 24 May 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/11/2/1 Part 1.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* Rix cites this letter, commenting that Casey argued for the necessity of helping restoration of Japan's pride and encouraging Japan's association with the West. However, Rix does not mention Casey's point that Japan's UN membership was not the biggest issue in the bilateral relationship. Rix, *The Australia-Japan Political Alignment*, p. 121.

⁴¹ Australian Mission to the UN to Secretary, External Affairs, 5 March 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4.

⁴² Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 8 May 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0127.

⁴³ Australia's term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council was from January 1956 to December 1957.

⁴⁴ Kase to Shigemitsu, 20 February 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 453-454.

⁴⁵ Kase to Shigemitsu, 28 May 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042; Australian Mission to the UN to Canberra, 31 May 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4.

⁴⁶ Minister for External Affairs to Canberra, 8 June 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4; Canberra to Australian Embassy in Tokyo, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4; Australian Embassy in Tokyo to Canberra, 8 June 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4.

take the initiative when the Security Council considered the admission of Japan. In response, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed his gratitude for Australia's support but made it clear that this initiative was a matter for the Australian government to decide.⁴⁷

However, this concept was shelved, as Tokyo was reluctant to prematurely present its admission to the Security Council. As indicated by William Douglass Forsyth, one of the assistant secretaries of External Affairs, the Australian government's position was that the idea of Australia's initiative seemed to be acceptable to the Japanese policymakers but was suspended due to Japan-Soviet negotiations and the Upper House election in Japan which was scheduled to take place on 8 July. Forsyth then predicted that Canberra's action would be guided by Tokyo's desire.⁴⁸ This position remained unchanged when Morocco and (a little later) Tunisia applied for the UN membership in July 1956. There were discussions on whether Japan's admission would also be raised in the Security Council. While Washington was open to such discussions, Tokyo was not, because the Japanese officials thought that such an endeavour would fail and delay Japan's ultimate admission into the UN.⁴⁹ As a result, although the Australian officials temporarily thought about making time for consultations between the United States and Japan by deferring the Security Council's meeting, Japan's candidature was not raised in the meeting regarding admission of Morocco and Tunisia.⁵⁰

The postponement had no effect on Japan's appreciation for Australia's support. On 17 July, immediately after the question of Morocco's membership was raised, Ichiro Kawasaki, the Director of Bureau for International Cooperation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told an Australian diplomat that the Japanese government 'felt obliged to discuss [the] question with Australia as Australia had taken such a prominent part in supporting Japan's entry'.⁵¹ Kase also handed over an aide-memoire conveying Japan's reluctance to see its admission discussed in the Security Council in July 1956 to Australia, the United States, and Britain on the understanding that this document would not be shared with other countries. In short, Australia was one of only three countries kept in the loop by Japan regarding its campaign strategy, signifying Japan's recognition of Australia as a prominent supporter of its return to international society.⁵² Therefore, the idea of Australia's sponsoring the event survived. In mid-July 1956, Australia was listed as one of the few countries whose initiatives were appropriate for Japan.⁵³ However, the issue remained frozen here.

Secondly, Japan saw Australia as a country that would be useful for consolidating the Commonwealth's support for its accession to the UN. The Japanese officials saw the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, which was held in London from late June to early July 1956, as an immediate target of Japan's campaign for the UN membership. They thought of Australia as a country that should be asked for support regarding the conference. Moreover, Kase's report received a handwritten comment reminding him of the significance of the Commonwealth, implying that they attached importance to this loose international unit.⁵⁴

In the leadup to this conference, the Japanese government proactively approached the Australian counterpart. In early

⁴⁷ Australian Ambassador in Tokyo to Secretary, External Affairs, 21 June 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; Shigemitsu to Suzuki, 18 June 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042.

⁴⁸ Record of Conversation between Forsyth and Paterson, 6 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁴⁹ Shigemitsu to Kase, 16 July 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 517-518; Kase to Shigemitsu, 17 July 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 529-530; Australian Embassy in Tokyo to External Affairs, 17 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁵⁰ External Affairs to Australian Mission to the UN, 19 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; External Affairs to Australian Mission to the UN, 20 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁵¹ Australian Embassy in Tokyo to External Affairs, 17 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁵² Australian Mission to the UN to Canberra, 19 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁵³ Kokuren Kamei Mondai ni kansuru Kawasaki Kyokutyo to Mogan Sanjikan tonon Kaidan Yoshi, 13 July 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042. This reference to Australia was made as a comment against a suggestion that India's initiative might be successful.

⁵⁴ Bureau for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Kokuren Kamei Jitsugen no tame no Hosaku ni kansuru Ken', 16 April 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 468-469; Kase to Shigemitsu, 28 May 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042.

May 1956, Suzuki suggested that Menzies should be asked to help Japan's bid for the UN membership before his departure for London later that month. Tokyo accepted his suggestion, instructing Suzuki to approach Menzies in an appropriate manner. This instruction was executed promptly.⁵⁵ On 17 May, Suzuki asked the Australian Prime Minister to raise interest in Japan's admission into the UN during his world tour. The Japanese Ambassador also proposed to Casey that a plan for bringing Japan into the UN should be discussed in the conference. In his reply, Casey stressed Australia's intention to assist Japan in its campaign. Therefore, although Menzies avoided making direct commitment by saying that he would consult with Casey, Casey's attitude was clear and an agreement between Menzies and Casey was easily formed or preexisted the Japanese request.⁵⁶ On 21 May, less than a week from Suzuki's meetings with Menzies and Casey, the Cabinet formally decided that Menzies would make efforts to bring Japan into the UN.⁵⁷ This speed at which the decision was made shows that the Australian government was firm regarding its support for Japan.

What the Japanese hoped for from Menzies was not clearly specified by Suzuki. However, their biggest hope regarding the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference seemed to obtain an expression of collective support by the participants. If possible, as Suzuki suggested, Tokyo wished that this expression would be made in a formal way.⁵⁸ The Australian government was not averse to this idea. On 22 June, Casey wrote to Menzies in London, expressing that he was in favour of Menzies's considering Suzuki's suggestion and that the collective expression of support for the Japanese admission by the Commonwealth countries would have advantages in emphasizing the international isolation of the Soviets and pressurizing them. Immediately after that, Arthur Tange, then Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, informed Suzuki of what Casey recommended to Menzies.⁵⁹

During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Menzies argued that members of the Commonwealth should do their best to bring Japan into the UN. This remark was transmitted to Suzuki by James Plimsoll, one of the assistant secretaries of External Affairs. Furthermore, all participants in the conference expressed their support for the Japanese admission. On July 5, *The Times*, a prestigious British newspaper, carried a report of this unanimous support.⁶⁰ However, the conference's final communiqué did not include an explicit reference to the Commonwealth's collective support for Japan's candidature. Instead, probably due to the Commonwealth's internal disagreement regarding international affairs such as the Chinese representation at the UN, the communiqué was confined to an expression of general desire for further expansion and the attainment of universality of the UN. In other words, the communiqué was vaguer and less direct than what Menzies had said. Nevertheless, Plimsoll insisted that this statement gave strong support to Japan's candidature and thus it practically fulfilled Japan's wish.⁶¹ Although the communiqué may have fallen short of Japan's hope, Tokyo generally accepted Plimsoll's argument. Shigemitsu stated that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference confirmed 'united support' for the Japanese membership, commenting that Japan's aims regarding the conference were largely achieved.⁶² This attitude was shared by the Japanese Embassy in Canberra. Suzuki highly appreciated Australia's attitude and policy towards Japan. He wrote that the Australian government had recently made particularly favourable efforts in relation to pending matters such as the UN membership. In late July, immediately before temporarily returning to Japan for preparing for Menzies's planned visit to

⁵⁵ Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 8 May 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0127; Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 10 May 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 470-471; Shigemitsu to Suzuki, 16 May 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, p. 476.

⁵⁶ Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 17 May 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0144; Record of Conversation among Suzuki, Casey and Loomes, 17 May 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4.

⁵⁷ Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 23 May 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0144.

⁵⁸ External Affairs to Australian High Commission in London, 22 June 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*; Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 22 June 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042.

⁶⁰ Australian High Commission in London to Canberra, 4 July 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4; Record of Conversation among Suzuki, Casey and Loomes, 9 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 10 July 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042.

⁶¹ Australian High Commission in London to External Affairs, 5 July 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4; Nishi to Shigemitsu, 5 July 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042; Rix, *The Australia-Japan Political Alignment*, p. 121.

⁶² Record of Conversation among Suzuki, Casey and Loomes, 9 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 10 July 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042.

⁶³ Shigemitsu to Japanese Ambassadors in Commonwealth countries and at the UN, 10 July 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042.

Japan, he conveyed Japan's appreciation for these efforts to Casey.⁶⁴

In this way, Australia actively supported Japan's campaign to join the UN by utilizing Australia's status not only as an elected member of the Security Council but also as a principal member of the Commonwealth. Even though complimentary factors probably existed, this support contributed to building trust in Australia within Japan's foreign policy establishment. In this sense, it may be said that the aims of the Australian government, as outlined in Casey's letter to Menzies, were achieved to a considerable degree.

At the same time, a new concern for the Australian government evolved in tandem with these advances. This was Japan's policy to pursue closer relations at the UN with members of the Afro-Asian group, an international grouping mostly made up of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa.⁶⁵ Like the approach to the Commonwealth, this policy was designed to increase the international support for Japan's admission into the UN. By bolstering international support, Japan aimed to bring pressure on the Soviet Union so that its representative would grant Japan a seat at the UN, separately from the ongoing negotiations between the two countries. In fact, a glimpse into how the Japanese officialdom came up with its campaign strategy suggests that the Afro-Asian group was its main focus. After John Forster Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, visited Japan in late March 1956, Kase received instructions based on this policy. These instructions drew his attention to the necessity to create a situation where the Soviet Union would have to be cautious in exercising its veto by mobilizing international, principally, Afro-Asian opinion.⁶⁶ In May, a more concrete plan was sent to overseas posts of Japan. The emphasis on the Afro-Asian group was clear in this plan, too. By this plan, the Japanese officials decided that they would strive to secure strong support of the Afro-Asian group with which the Soviet Union was trying to strengthen its connections. They thought that a communiqué issued at the Bandung Conference in late April 1955 was valuable for that purpose, because it recommended admission of nine countries, including Japan, into the UN, but did not mention Outer Mongolia. They also viewed that joining the UN backed by the Afro-Asian voice would be desirable for Japan for avoiding any misunderstanding by the Afro-Asian countries. Actually, one reason why Tokyo considered the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference as a useful forum for its campaign was that the conference included some of these countries.⁶⁷

Following Tokyo's directives, Kase worked on the Afro-Asian group at the UN quite successfully. The Australian officials were aware of this. Walker reported in late May that Kase was attempting to 'keep question alive' with the Afro-Asian group in preparation for Japan's admission into the UN.⁶⁸ In early June, Japan was invited to attend a meeting of members of this group prior to Japan's admission to the UN. Although the decision was made without consulting senior officials in Tokyo, the Japanese officials at the UN accepted the invitation and Tokyo gave ex post facto approval, with Japan becoming a regular member of the Afro-Asian group before its entry into the UN. The news was reported to Canberra on 14 June.⁶⁹ On 25 July, an American newspaper reported that members of the Afro-Asian group would collectively support Japan's candidature, which was also reported to Canberra.⁷⁰ In this way, the Australian government was paying attention to information about Japan's growing ties with the newly emergent force in the UN.

⁶⁴ Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 10 July 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042; Record of Conversation among Suzuki, Casey and Loomes, 25 July 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4; Suzuki to Takasaki, 27 July 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0127. Suzuki mentioned Class B and C Japanese war criminal as another pending matter. Menzies was scheduled to visit Japan on his way back to Australia from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London.

⁶⁵ For an account of the origin of the Afro-Asian group, see Taizo Miyagi, *Bandon Kaigi to Nihon no Ajia Fukki: Amerika to Ajia no Hazama de* (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2001), pp. 24-26.

⁶⁶ Shigemitsu to Kase, 4 April 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 466-467.

⁶⁷ Taneine, 'Gaimusho to Nihon no Kokuren Kamei Gaiko', pp. 356-357.

⁶⁸ Australian Mission to the UN to External Affairs, 26 May 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁶⁹ Taneine, 'Gaimusho to Nihon no Kokuren Kamei Gaiko', pp. 357, 378; Liang Pan, 'Reisenki Nihon no Gaiko to Ajia, Afurika: "Zeze Hihi" no Shisei no Hikari to Kage', in Yuichi Hosoya ed., *Gurobaru Gabanansu to Nihon* (Tokyo: Chuokoronshinsha, 2013), p. 227; Extract Sitrep. no. 24, 14 June 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁷⁰ Australian Mission to the UN to Secretary, External Affairs, 26 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

Suzuki verified the information gathered by the Australian diplomats on 19 June. On that occasion, the Japanese Ambassador gave Tange and Forsyth an aide-memoire expressing Japan's intention to ask the Afro-Asian countries 'for their support which will be effective in forestalling the objection by the Soviets'.⁷¹ Then, he orally reemphasized this point, adding that the Bandung Conference's communiqué omitted Outer Mongolia and that Kase accepted the invitation to participate in meetings of the Afro-Asian group. Unsurprisingly, Suzuki reported this conversation back to Tokyo, writing that he had aimed at gaining the Australian officials' trust and had touched upon considerably subtle points.⁷² This frankness can be seen as additional evidence of increasing trust in Australia within the Japanese officialdom.

However, behind this frankness, there were substantial differences between the Australian and Japanese governments regarding the Afro-Asian group. At that time, the Japanese officials were largely optimistic about this international grouping. They thought that this group was something like a club and Japan would not need to make any prior commitments when Japan became a member. In short, they assumed that the membership of the Afro-Asian group would have little diplomatic consequences for Japan.⁷³ Their view about behaviours of the Afro-Asian countries was also generally positive. In an internal document examining the Afro-Asian group at the UN, they optimistically observed that the Afro-Asian countries were exhibiting sufficiently moderate behaviours. According to them, this was evidenced by their experience at the tenth UN General Assembly session in 1955.⁷⁴ Canberra did not share Tokyo's optimism at all. The Australian policymakers were far more sensitive about possible implications of the Afro-Asian group's international emergence. Since the Bandung Conference, they had become concerned about the possibility that members of the Afro-Asian group may become increasingly shackled by a majority view within the group as it came to hold regular meetings during the General Assembly's session. In particular, this concern about the regular meetings underlined differences between Canberra and Tokyo. Contrary to the former's concern, the latter did not attach great importance to these meetings. Even though the Japanese officials noticed that the Afro-Asian countries had started to hold monthly meetings since late 1955, they thought that the aim of these meetings was to have free discussions. Noting that there were various views within the Afro-Asian group on how to deal with international problems, they did not expect the Japanese government to be bound by any internal agreement within the group.⁷⁵ Therefore, at least in the middle of 1956, Australia and Japan had totally different views concerning the emergence of the Afro-Asian group.⁷⁶

How did the Australian government react to Japan's policy of seeking closer ties with members of the Afro-Asian group at the UN? As stated previously in relation to the Cabinet Decision in August 1954, Australia wanted Japan to be firmly aligned with the Western camp in the Cold War. Casey's letter to Menzies made this desire crystal clear, too. On the contrary, in explaining possible implications of Japan's continued exclusion from the UN for Japan's international alignment, he never mentioned Japan's relations with the Afro-Asian group which had already started to exercise its influence at the UN since 1953 and further consolidated its position via the Bandung Conference.⁷⁷ In short, the Minister for External Affairs neither saw Japan's membership of the Afro-Asian group as a crucial determinant of Japan's place in the world nor expected the Afro-

⁷¹ Japanese Ambassador in Canberra to External Affairs, 'On Japan's Admission to the United Nations', 19 June 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁷² Record of Conversation among Suzuki, Tange, and Forsyth, 19 June 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 19 June 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, B'-0042.

⁷³ Pan, 'Reisenki Nihon no Gaiko to Ajia, Afurika', p. 227.

⁷⁴ First Division, Bureau for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Kokuren ni okeru AA Gurupu ni tsuite', 9 June 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 488-491.

⁷⁵ For an example of Australia's concern about the emergence of the Afro-Asian group, see Minister for External Affairs, 'Asian-African Conference Bandung 18th-24th April 1955', 30 May 1955, NAA A9564, 221/4/4 Part 1. For a general account of this concern and Australia's foreign policy, see David Lowe, 'Australia at the United Nations in the 1950s', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 51, 2 (1997), pp. 171-181.

⁷⁶ First Division, Bureau for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Kokuren ni okeru AA Gurupu ni tsuite', 9 June 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 488-491; Junko Tomaru, 'Japan in British Regional Policy towards South-East Asia, 1945-1960', in Makoto Iokibe, Caroline Rose, Junko Tomaru, and John Weste eds., *Japanese diplomacy in the 1950s: from isolation to integration* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 60.

⁷⁷ Minister for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 24 May 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/11/2/1 Part 1; Kewku Ampiah, *The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: the Reactions of the US, UK and Japan* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007), p. 22.

Asian connection to push Japan towards neutralization. This assessment was shared by the Australian officials. When Tange wrote to Watt as a part of instructions for the new Australian Ambassador in Tokyo in April 1956, he recommended that the new Ambassador keep a close eye on the development of neutralism. He thought that neutralism was not strong at the moment but could increase in the future, coupled with a possible rise in anti-American sentiment. However, although he mentioned Japan's claim to a leading part in Asia and its desire for independent foreign policy as a probable basis for Japanese neutralism, the permanent head of the Department of External Affairs gave no indication that the Australian government was particularly concerned about Japan's closer engagement with members of the Afro-Asian group.⁷⁸ Therefore, there was no evidence that Australia feared that this engagement may influence Japan to adopt a neutralist course. Rather, some Australian policymakers hoped that Japan might play a positive role in moderating this international grouping. Walker even speculated that Japan, after its admission into the UN, would challenge India's and, to a lesser extent, Egypt's dominance in the Afro-Asian caucus, both of which were seen as significantly less pro-Western than Japan.⁷⁹ In this way, Australia tended to be rather optimistic about Japan's engagement with the Afro-Asian group and disagreement between the two countries over this international grouping, although substantial, had not reached the surface, at least until the middle of 1956.

The Suez Crisis and its Aftermath

The Suez Crisis, which stemmed from Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 and prompted cancellation of Menzies's planned visit to Japan, changed the situation considerably, exposing the substantial disagreement between Australia and Japan. Although attempts were made to resolve the crisis through negotiations including two canal users' conferences, these attempts failed because Britain, France and Israel invaded the canal area on 31 October. Australia's stance on the crisis is well-documented.⁸⁰ Menzies was determined to support the three countries even after their military action. He justified this action, insisting that if there was no action on their part, the situation in the canal area could become uncontrollable. Although his colleagues did not necessarily agree with him, the Japanese government may have felt that Menzies represented the Australian government when it came to the Suez Crisis.⁸¹ On the other hand, Japan's position was subtle. Tokyo saw amicable relations with the West as a cornerstone of its diplomacy, but it also wanted to gain support from the Afro-Asian countries for its admission into the UN. Keeping this position in mind, the Japanese officials devised a policy to encourage reconciliation between the West and the Afro-Asian group through the UN's mediation. They implemented this policy by asking Egypt to bring the matter to the UN and to accept the Security Council's proposal for mediation. The Japanese government also reserved its participation in the Suez Canal Users' Association and opposed sanctions against Egypt for creating a situation where negotiations between the West and Egypt could be facilitated. Its aim was to protect the Western camp's general interests by helping mediation between Egypt and Britain, France and Israel. Japan also considered the importance of its relations with the United States.⁸² However, from an Australian perspective, this approach appeared to be pro-Afro-Asian. For instance, on 27 September, Watt noted that Japan's policy regarding the Suez Crisis proved that Japan was highly reluctant to put itself 'off side' of Asian opinion and that Japan saw Australia, in relation to this crisis, as a Western country with interests aligned with Britain.⁸³

Not long after the Australian envoy's submission, negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union reached a final stage.

⁷⁸ Secretary, External Affairs to Australian Ambassador in Tokyo, 4 April 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4.

⁷⁹ Australian Mission to the UN to External Affairs, 17 July 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁸⁰ For a general account of Australia's attitude towards the Suez Crisis, see W. J. Hudson, *Blind Loyalty: Australia and the Suez Crisis, 1956* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1989). Menzies visited Egypt in September 1956, engaging in unsuccessful negotiations with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser over an idea of international supervision of the Suez Canal.

⁸¹ Prime Minister of Australia, 'International Police Force for Suez', 3 November 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0155; Uyama to Kishi, 15 January 1957, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0155.

⁸² Taneine, 'Gaimusho to Nihon no Kokuren Kamei Gaiko', pp. 359-361; Sumio Hatano and Susumu Sato, 'Kishi Gaiko to Tonan Ajia: "Ajia no Ichiin" to shite', in Sumio Hatano and Sato Susumu eds., *Gendai Nihon no Tonan Ajia Seisaku: 1950-2005* (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 2007), p. 54.

⁸³ Australian Ambassador in Tokyo to Secretary, External Affairs, 27 September 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4.

Hatoyama visited Moscow from 7 October and Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was signed on 19 October. This declaration included a provision stating that the Soviet Union would support Japan's admission into the UN.⁸⁴ Canberra was interested in the progress of the negotiations and sought to obtain relevant information. On 3 October, Suzuki informed the Australians of Hatoyama's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union. Two weeks later, he acknowledged to them that Japan's admission into the UN was discussed in Moscow. According to the Japanese envoy, Casey was eager to learn how this matter unfolded in the negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow.⁸⁵ Right after this acknowledgement, Shigemitsu notified Kase that the Soviet Union's Prime Minister stated that if diplomatic relations were normalized, Moscow would support Japan's admission into the UN. On 31 October, Suzuki could tell Plimsoll that the Soviet Union seemed to be prepared to support Japan's admission without associating Japan with Outer Mongolia. The Japanese envoy also conveyed his government's hope that any initiative should be postponed.⁸⁶

Despite Tokyo's hope expressed by Suzuki, the issue of sponsorship had been resurrected even before the end of October. Canberra noted Tokyo's rejection of Moscow's introduction to the Security Council of a proposal for bringing Japan into the UN. Kadowaki emphasized the Japanese government's wish to be sponsored by friendly countries, not by the Soviet Union.⁸⁷ In fact, as early as 18 October, the External Affairs officials at home instructed Walker to 'keep in touch with Kase over sponsorship and timing'.⁸⁸ This early instruction implies that the Australian government had some aspiration to play a part in bringing Japan into the UN.

However, despite Tokyo's recognition of Australia's consistent support and outstanding part, the Suez Crisis had a substantial impact on the way Japan structured its strategy to join the UN, hampering Australia's aspiration to play a role in realizing Japan's admission into the organization. Instead of Australia's sponsorship, Japan was leaning towards the idea of an Afro-Asian country sponsoring its admission, which was indicated by information acquired by the Australian officials. For instance, Watt came to believe that Australia's support for the British and French during the Suez Crisis made the Japanese government less inclined to seek sponsorship from Australia.⁸⁹ In addition, the Australian Embassy in Tokyo reported on 29 November that:

it had been suggested in the press that in the Security Council the Japanese Government would prefer to be sponsored by all eleven members or, if this is not possible, by "a neutral country like Iran".⁹⁰

Iran was the only Afro-Asian country serving in the Security Council as of November 1956. Kase suggested to Walker that Iran may sponsor Japan as a representative of the Afro-Asian group.⁹¹

Although Walker gave an indirect warning by saying to his Japanese counterpart that Australia assumed that Japan did

⁸⁴ Taneine, 'Gaimusho to Nihon no Kokuren Kamei Gaiko', pp. 362-363.

⁸⁵ Record of Conversation among Suzuki, Uyama, Casey and Jamieson, 3 October 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; Record of Conversation among Suzuki, Uyama, Casey and Jamieson, 17 October 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/1 Part 4; Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 18 October 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0127.

⁸⁶ Shigemitsu to Kase, 20 October 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, p. 559; Record of Conversation between Suzuki and Plimsoll, 31 October 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁸⁷ New Zealand Legation in Tokyo to Secretary, External Affairs, New Zealand, 24 October 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2. For the Japanese record of this conversation, see Shigemitsu to Tani, Kase, and Nishi, 25 October 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 564-565.

⁸⁸ External Affairs to Australian Mission to the UN, 18 October 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁸⁹ Extract Ambassador's telegram No. 380 of 14 Nov. 1956 to External Affairs, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; Australian Embassy in Tokyo to External Affairs, 3 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁹⁰ Extract Sitrep No. 48, 29 November 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁹¹ Australian Mission to the UN to External Affairs, 30 November 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

not belong to ‘any monolithic Asian group’⁹², Kase’s suggestion prevailed. On 7 December, the Japanese officials formally decided that Iran, as a representative of the Afro-Asian group, would be requested to convene a meeting of the Security Council, while Peru would be requested to submit a proposal of Japan’s admission into the UN. Tokyo promptly informed Canberra of this decision. Kadowaki gave Watt a note ‘stating that Japan had asked Iran, “the only country from Afro-Asian region on Security Council,” to propose [a] Council meeting on 12th December’⁹⁴. This explicit reference to Iran was repeated in a telegram sent to several Japanese missions abroad.⁹⁵

This note also politely expressed Japan’s gratitude to Australia for its support. Watt was unconvinced by this politeness. According to him, it was an attempt:

to cover fact Japan has decided it was safest to use representatives
of two most numerous power blocs, rather than risk offending Arabs,
other Asians etc. by accepting sponsorship of Australia, which has
supported British and French intervention in Egypt.⁹⁶

He read Japan’s dishonest effort to use flowery language to obscure its genuine intentions from this attempt. However, there was nothing Australia could do for changing the course of events. The Security Council adopted a resolution recommending Japan’s admission into the UN on 12 December, and Japan became the eightieth member of the UN on 18 December.

As a result of this experience, the veteran Australian diplomat, who was ‘a major influence on policy-making towards Japan’⁹⁷, became particularly annoyed, issuing a dispatch to Tange on December 12. In this dispatch, he urged that Australia not only warn the Japanese that Australia would judge their attitude by their actions, not their words, but also give Suzuki a gentle ‘touch’ on Japan’s decision on its UN membership, although the meaning of ‘touch’ was not clarified.⁹⁸ This recommendation seemed to fall on deaf ears in Canberra, at least in relation to any ‘touch’ given to Suzuki. On the day after this recommendation was sent, Casey met Suzuki. Records of this meeting do not provide any evidence that ‘touch’ or pressure was given to the Japanese Ambassador.⁹⁹ The fact that Watt criticized Casey for being too lenient with the Japanese in March 1957 also testifies to Canberra’s inaction. The Minister was ‘constrained’ in criticizing Japan on this matter.¹⁰⁰ Australian archives do not provide conclusive grounds for this inaction. However, given Watt’s opinion that early attempts to approach the Japanese government would be futile due to tremendous uncertainty surrounding Japanese politics, it is possible that a lack of ideal timing for lobbying was to blame.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, Canberra might not have wanted to disturb ongoing trade negotiations with Japan, because trade was seen as more important in Australia-Japan relations than Japan’s admission into the UN.¹⁰² At any rate, as Plimsoll told Suzuki, Canberra’s general attitude was that how Japan would be admitted into the UN was a matter for

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ Shigemitsu to Yamada and Teraoka, 7 December 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, p. 584; Australian Mission at the UN to External Affairs, 7 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁹⁴ Australian Embassy in Tokyo to External Affairs, 7 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁹⁵ Shigemitsu to Nishi, Nishimura, Takeuchi etc., 8 December 1956, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho: Kokusai Rengo heno Kamei*, pp. 586-587.

⁹⁶ Australian Embassy in Tokyo to External Affairs, 7 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁹⁷ Walton, *Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia*, p. 14.

⁹⁸ Australian Ambassador in Tokyo to External Affairs, 12 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

⁹⁹ Record of Conversation among Suzuki, Casey and Arnott, 13 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; R. G. Casey diaries, 13 December 1956, MS6150, Vol. 21, box 29, NLA.

¹⁰⁰ David Walton, ‘Australia, Japan and the Region, 1952-65: The beginnings of security policy network’, in Brad Williams and Andrew Newman eds., *Japan, Australia and Asia-Pacific Security* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 12.

¹⁰¹ Australian Ambassador in Tokyo to Secretary, External Affairs, 12 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2. In December 1956, Hatoyama announced his retirement and a presidential election of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was held. Tanzan Ishibashi, the Minister for International Trade and Industry, won and became a new Prime Minister of Japan. But, he resigned due to illness in February 1957, being replaced by Nobusuke Kishi. Thus, from December 1956 to February 1957, Japan had three Prime Ministers and its domestic politics were extremely fluid.

¹⁰² Minister for External Affairs to Prime Minister, 24 May 1956, NAA A1838, 3103/10/11/2/1 Part 1. The trade negotiations started in August 1956.

the Japanese government to decide and Australia would follow its guidance.¹⁰³

Apart from an issue of the 'touch', the sponsorship issue raised another significant concern about Japan's external relations for Australia. In his dispatch, Watt picked up on Kase's 'tiredness' of the Afro-Asian group, which had been reported by Walker. In fact, Kase recommended to his home government in November 1956 that some Afro-Asian countries were exhibiting unwise behaviours and that Tokyo may need to seriously consider its relations with the Afro-Asian group. This suggestion indicates that this 'tiredness' was not necessarily a complete lie.¹⁰⁴ Nonetheless, the Australian envoy was critical of the Japanese government, commenting that despite his professed 'tiredness', Japan was still keen to avoid any action that would trigger opposition from the Afro-Asian countries. By this comment, he alluded to a concern that Japan might be tempted to court these countries by blindly following them in the UN rather than considering merits of each case. It was a dismal prospect for Australia. As Casey indicated, the Australian government lamented seeing the Afro-Asian countries banding together and taking collective actions driven by their anti-Western feeling, in the wake of a series of crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.¹⁰⁵ Because of this situation, the Australians could not dismiss this prospect, no matter how uncomfortable it was, becoming more concerned about the Afro-Asian connection's implications for Japan's foreign policy. This concern was incorporated into an official briefing paper for Menzies's historic visit to Japan in April 1957 which noted Japan's determination not to offend countries in the Afro-Asian group.¹⁰⁶ The way the sponsorship issue unfolded taught the Australian government that the Japanese attached importance to their membership in the Afro-Asian group, informing Australia's subsequent approaches towards Japan.¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

This article has dealt with Australia's policy regarding Japan's admission into the UN and how this issue informed Australia-Japan relations from 1952 to the end of 1956. From 1952 to late 1955, Australia, despite its commitment to support Japan's candidature, did not play an active role in bringing Japan into the UN. The Australians thought that Japan should not be given preferential treatment, whereas the Japanese did not expect much from Australia. However, from late 1955 to 1956, Australia took the initiative in supporting Japanese membership of the UN. This initiative was based on continuing consideration of keeping Japan within the Western camp in the Cold War. Australia's attempts to assist Japan's campaign to enter the UN contributed to strengthening mutual trust between foreign policy circles of Australia and Japan, with Tokyo trying to incorporate Australia into its campaign strategy as a dependable ally. But the idea of Australia's sponsoring Japan's admission did not materialize. Instead, the Suez Crisis and subsequent developments exposed substantial differences of opinions between Canberra and Tokyo about the Afro-Asian group. Australia came to see Japan as a member of this international grouping which was unwilling to oppose its other members. The issue of Japan's admission into the UN ended up raising a new concern about Japan's international orientation within the Australian government.

In this way, the article has situated the issue of Japan's admission into the UN within the context of broader Australia-Japan relations and international environment. Its finding has ramifications for the historiography of Australia-Japan relations in the early post-WWII period. First, the article takes a close look at the Australian government's policy and its implications for Australia-Japan relations, addressing a gap in the literature identified in the introduction of the article. Relatedly, the article

¹⁰³ Record of Conversation between Suzuki and Plimsoll, 6 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; Suzuki to Shigemitsu, 7 December 1956, Diplomatic Archives of Japan, A'-0127.

¹⁰⁴ Australian Mission to the UN to External Affairs, 30 November 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2; Pan, *The United Nations in Japan's Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-1992*, p. 45.

¹⁰⁵ Australian Ambassador in Tokyo to External Affairs, 12 December 1956, NAA A9564, 223/1 Part 2.

¹⁰⁶ R. G. Casey diaries, 8 November 1956, MS6150, Vol. 21, box 29, NLA. From late October to early November 1956, the Hungarian uprising occurred but was suppressed by the Soviet Union.

¹⁰⁷ Brief for the Prime Minister: Visit to Japan-April 1957 Volume I Japan-General, April 1957, NAA A1838, 3103/10/11/2/1 Part 1.

examines the intersection of Australia-Japan relations and the Afro-Asian group's emergence in international forums, portraying Australia's anxiety about Japan's dual international identity, namely both as an ally of the West and a member of the Afro-Asian group. Finally, the article also contributes to the historiography of Australia-Japan relations by highlighting change in Japan's view of Australia. One prominent Japanese historian points out that mutual trust was fostered between the two countries through their trade negotiations.¹⁰⁸ The article adds to his thesis by showing that Australia's active support for Japan's admission into the UN also contributed to cultivation of this trust, although it admits that there was a setback related to differences over the Afro-Asian group. These findings propose revising a trade-centric view established by prior research by highlighting the necessity to emphasize the political aspect of the bilateral relationship.

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Note: this list does not include unpublished documents held by NAA, NLA, and Diplomatic Archives of Japan.

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¹⁰⁸ Teruhiko Fukushima, 'Nihon Gaiko ni okeru tai Osutoraria Kankei no Imi: Sengo Nichigo Kankei no Hatsuten Katei', in Kanazawa Kogyo Daigaku Kokusaigaku Kenkyujyo ed., *Nihon Gaiko to Kokusai Kankei* (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 2009), p. 193.

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