The Battle of Midway from the Standpoint of Historical Psychology

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Those historical and historic events and happenings that arose in relations to the IJN's offensive operations and the USN's defensive actions which centered around on June 4th, 1942 (5th on the Japanese calendar, due to the international date change line) are termed aggregatedly as "The Battle of Midway." When under perusal, however, it could be considered stereoscopic, multi-phased warfare that had been fought in the phase of not just land, sea and air of the mid-Pacific ocean theater, but also of the under-water sound layers, and ionic ones as well, the latter being situated far above the very earth's atmospheric sphere as the occasional inducer of the Dellinger phenomena that block the semination of radio waves and at other times of the Heaviside Layer as the very causer of that skip-distancing of radio waves, etc.

Thus, the contents analyses of those multi-phased Battles of Midway actions relate not only to the analytical skills of climatic or meterological data obtained but also the overwhelming uses of cryptographic and other radio communications intelligence. As the results, the Battle of Midway had been and can be considered that of multi-nationaled warfares, or at least as the forerunner of the ultra modern futuristic warfares of mosaic complexes.

Of the last statement, the author of this thesis expects in the near future, much advance to be made; but at the moment, the author tried to present his central theme as follows:

That the wakes of history or historical events and happenings could be dramatically turned or sea-changed as to their basic course due not just to the psychic characteristics of individuals and groups involved, but also to the past psychic hystereses in markedly vectored ways.

Yes, indeed, no psychologist can rest unperturbedly when he or she is faced to probe into the hitherto uncovered inner layers of these historic and historical data and
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phenomena summed up in the Battle of Midway.

For all these, the author deplores on the existing state of affairs especially when he thinks of how little has been done here in Japan by us, the Japanese psychologists and psychiatrists as well, in their proving of the basic analyses of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884 – 1943), the most decisive key figure on the Battle of Midway, the man becoming the very turning point of the entire Pacific War and also of the World War II, by his own life fashion, in his own style.

It should be noted that the fact that Admiral Yamamoto, Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet had not just been laden with his bounden duty of safe guarding the Emperor and his empire, but also overwhelmingly concerned in his execution of it because of his Nagaoka clan's stigma or the non-eradicable historical past in which the Nagaoka clan (from which the admiral sprang) had been considered the arch enemy to the Imperial rule in the eve of the Meiji restoration.

Having come out of such the past (psychic hysteresis), the same man that had come to assume for himself the Chief Maritime Guardian for His Majesty's welfare and his empire, should have been enhancing in his psyche's depths, quantities of Sorge (deep-seated anxieties) to which the post-war Japanese youth can hardly sympathize with.

In a word, the situation in which Admiral Yamamoto had been enthralled is akin to the ordeals of the little stated Prussian king, Frederick II, the Great's, or more recently of that German General Staff's von Schliffen's ordeals. Boiling down to one singular phraseology, it was the case of the deep-seated anxieties of simultaneously facing the double or triple enemies in the so-called bi- or tri-frontal warfare, faced with the Russian, French, and English forces.

Translated into the much-more militaristic terms, neither Clausewitz (1780 – 1831)'s "von Krieg," nor Hans Delbrück (1848 – 1929)'s Ermattungsstrategie (Attritions Strategy) could not possibly ensure a sure victory against the double or triple opponents (moreover, in case of the IJN's, not just the Anglo-American, but the Russian, Dutch, and Chinese, etc., involved).

Having faced these ordeals, Yamamoto's sole chance or breakthrough must have been, in my view, the employment of Abshreckungsstrategie (Threatening strategy: that was, by means of whittle-downing of the enemies and their very fighting spirit as well by a rapid succession of offensive after offensive actions until the opponent be
reduced to the state of asking for peace. This last view on Frederick II had been proposed by Prof Koser in his paper entitled “Die preußische Kriegsführung in siebenjährigen Kriege” (Hist. Zeitschrifte, Bd. 92, 1904).

Though those that are not familiar with the military and naval histories might be confused, Clausewititian Vernichtungsstrategie (Annihilation Strategy) is akin to the British naval tradition or legacy even that had stemmed from Admiral Nelson’s Copenhagen (1801) and Trafalgar (1805) and passed to American Captain Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon the History’s techno-cultural legacies.

This point of reasoning leads us further into a view as follows: Admiral Yamamoto’s strategy, despite its superficial difference, had enhanced the essentially similar quality as well as quantity of problems that had been troubling even Adolf Hitler (1889 – 1945).

Not only did Yamamoto despair of the possibility of success in carrying attrition warfare against the US with her inexhaustible resources, might and spirit as well. In the end all Yamamoto could do and in fact did, turned out to have been the very execution of Koserian strategy of threats, thus that PHA, despite surface resemblance to the war of annihilation, it was the War of Abschreckungsstrategie or War of Threatening Strategy.

The fact that deep inside his inner psyche Admiral Yamamoto had been holding the very Koserian view, is amply betraying in his 1941 letter addressed to Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, entitled “A View about the Naval Preparedness.”

It says in a gist as follows: at the start of the Japano-American war, the first thing that should be done is the categorical use of forces against the US Pacific Fleet at Oahu, Hawaii, to the extent that they be forced to lose their fighting spirit and will as well.

This too optimistic a view as it turned out had never been sustained, despite Yamamoto’s wistful thinking and assumption. The PHA had come to raise the entire Americans for avenging war. To this decisive calling of the US nation to the cause, the superb wit of Admiral Knox in Washington ordering that the very extent of damages sustained by the US Pacific Fleet and Fortress Hawaii, be limited to the bare minimum, had come to be amply rewarded. In another words, Knox’s wiser decisions of shifting the blame squarely upon the IJN’s sneak attack by Yamamoto and calling the just-started war as that of the avenging casus célèbre for the immoral aggressor

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Yamamoto had come to leave no room for him and Japan to initiate a negotiated peace, only forcing him to the bitter end.

Now that the chance for the easy victory had retreated into impossible horizons of distance like Fata Morgana for Yamamoto and his Combined Fleet, he had been forced to take Midway as a lure to the remaining Admiral Halsey (1882–1959)'s carrier striking forces.

This sort of harassed and hurried reasoning should have been occupying Yamamoto's and his right-hand man and senior staff officer Captain Kameto Kuroshima (1893–1965)'s mind.

For all these, how can we account for the hasty advance operations that had been hatched out of Yamamoto's HQ aboard the Battleship Yamato? The extent of the Midway Operations which involved the occupation had been, never enhanced outside the Combined Fleet, even among the most ultra patriotic expansionist Japanese officers and men, even in the eve of the Pacific War, not to speak of the Midway eve.

A Singular but Cardinal Point That Has Never been Raised To This Day

Strangely, even after the passage of some half a century's time, the preceeding interpretation as mine has never been voiced, not to speak of being printed. That is: had we vectored the direction of the IJN's advance across the Pacific ocean to the Midway islands, it would have turned the table, and becoming the much celebrated concept of "Ring Formation" strategy (which had been lauded as the possible strategy taken by the US Pacific Fleet as they sped on to the annihilation of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet, in case of the American-Japanese War, in the pre-war days).

Incidentally, the very defensive actions and make-up tactics taken by the inferior-ratioed US forces at Midway, resemble, oddly enough that of the so-called Wheeled-out Actions tactic (Kuruma-gakari-no-Senpo) as had been recommended in the maedieval Japanese war manuel, as the most plausible resort left for the inferior force on the brink of great crisis.

The above-mentioned accidental irony has been unnoticed except by this thesis author. Putting the coincidenece aside, significances or implications contained in the
Midway Battle's lessons or even cultural legacies are much for us the Japanese to be born even in this age of peaceful reciprocal exchanges of cultures and trades.

Now that the blind belief in the ever-rising Yen and ascending figures of GNP Gross National Product (which reminds me of the BIG Gun/Big Battlewagon doctrine) had already been on the wane, we have to keep ourselves low. Moreover, that Admiral Nagumo (1887–1944)'s 1st Carrier Striking Forces with their mad dash also reminds me of the advances of our business people's wolf-like behaviors, that have been causing or casting their ominous shadows on the world over, to the extent that red lights have been blinking everywhere against our thought-less one-way exportism.

Had we looked back to the domestic situations, we should have been aware of the following.

Already that rich-harvest myth, hitherto sustained due to (what they had been believing) ever rising value of land or acreage, had fallen to the ground in Japan since January of the year 1990, left remained are ever-accelerating ups and downs of stocks and shares.

Even in the era or arena of otherwise economic issues, one cannot but fear the sudden crush of the money market, the phenomenon of which reminds me of the socalled porpoising tendency of flying boats as seen in the unpredictable sudden diving of Nishiki (Type 2) Big Flying-boats into the ocean depths due to their unwelcome characteristics. To explicate further this porpoising tendency that is named after the fashion of that water-surface-cutting-jumps-of-a-stone-like behavior as one would often obersve in either porpoises or flying fishes just before their sudden plunge into the deep.

Despite this danger and even at the face of sudden falls or falterings of Yen value, false images of the Japanese made rich overnight (nouveau riche) seem not to have lost their gilded images. In fact, the unwelcome and un-healthy new rich images seem to have been enlarged, to the extent of earning unwelcome distortions and notorieties.

As the result, not only the earnest savings of the working masses but even the products of the quality control methods of the highest calibre too, have been looked askance, as if that of the fate of a morning glory that would glory in the morning and fade overnight.

Thus, one end result of this phenomenon, is a chorus of "Kill Japs," unwelcome echoes of the late Admiral Halsy in WW II, having turned the mass and acreage belief
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into the near massacre.

Having faced this turn of events, we should have taken the true lesson from the Battle of Midway over a half a century ago.

Indeed, we should not crutch the shred of our forgone glories of the now-defunct IJN's. It is high time for us the Japanese to face to the future, forsaking those one-sided epics or episodes of the self-laudatory story of the IJN.

Thus setting the forward-looking critical view, the author of this critical thesis would like to point out the following facts, which seem to need psychological as well as psychic accountings.

The points are: the existence of the weird-looking happenings there in the midst of the IJN's HQ during the two-digital figured Showa eras, that had walked up into the multi-storied Pagoda masts of not only of the superbattleship Yamato's but also of her successor Musashi's! They came up there, as if the workings of some computer viruses, and the end results were the abrupt deaths of Admiral Yamamoto (1943), and his successor and colleague Admiral Koga's (1944)! Of these curious nearly Lufcadio Hearn-like story, I would refer later in this paper. Meanwhile back to the No. 4 omen.

Summed up curtly, starting with earlier falgships of the IJN's, battleships Nagato and Mutsu, and then ending with those already-mentioned superdreadnoughts Yamato and Masashi, almost at every turn of these flag flying flagships, eerie stories that should have paled any gothic roman lover had existed. Of these I had written thrice, one of the first of these magazine articles being the "Navy that had been lured into death under the Spell of the Deadly Nos. 4s (Deaths)," in Bungeishunjys's September issue, 1966. Incidentally, this happened to have been my first published article in a nation-wide non-academic magazine.

Nevertheless, the fact remains as I had pointed out by these, to this day, unchallenged, my mentions came hitting at the empty air, except the responses of the witty editors of the nation's leading magazines. For all that, no one should be able to deny the following facts propounded by me that the psychic and psychological influences had taken the devastating death tolls in the course and conduct of the other IJN command and their officers and men in the months and years to come until the day of defeat and the defunction of the once proud IJN's.

I am afraid that this preamble-like introductory explication within the introductory has taken too much space and time, I realize I should hurry on to the
main psychological criticism part. Nevertheless, before going into that work, let me quote that famous Dantian prelude again in the famous American poet Longfellow's translated version.

Midway upon the journey of our life
I found myself within a forest dark.
For the straight-forward pathway had been lost ....

Intuitional Gambler Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884 – 1943)

versus

Objectively Calculated Risk-taker Admiral Chester Nimitz (1885 – 1966)

It should be recalled that when the ex-director Navigation Bureau's Admiral Nimitz had taken the command of the US Pacific Fleet, it was done on the narrow deck of the USN submarine Greyling, on the 31st of Dec., 1941, 10:00 AM. And almost simultaneously, across the three thousand and several hundred miles of the Pacific ocean distanced, at the interval time gap of nineteen hours and a half, the local Japanese time registering 5:30 AM on the 1st of Jan., 1942, and aboard the battleship Nagato, deep inside the Hashirajima anchorage, the IJN's war-time haven, the IJN's HQ staff were at rest. And as betraying in Yamamoto's Chief of Staff Vice Admiral M. Ugaki's diary page, most of Yamamoto's staff officers were lying in their victor's dreams, their respective stomachs and rest of digestive system being heavily engaged in the task of digesting the New Year's Eve Soba noodles and some other delicacies, and on the whole seemed not one soul would have been foresensing the appearance of "Hand on the wall," that should have been looming before them.

Nevertheless, at least one man should have been in an arousal state. The very man that had been in the semiarousal state at the very hour, was Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi (1892 – 1942). As symbolized in the famed piece of the drowsing wooden cat carved out by Jingoro Hidari at the Nikko shrine, the said Radom Yamaguchi's consciousness would have been in that sentinel's readiness state.

It should be recalled in a comparative sketch, that even in the American side the newly appointed USN's Pacific Fleet's C-in-C Admiral Nimitz had been confessing to
his wife of his feeling himself like a cat in Lewis Carroll's famed story that had been unable to sleep. Despite this inner psyche, the same American admiral, when presenting himself to the American press, and to his subordinate officers and men, kept on appearing as a completely relaxed stroller with his calm, but steady gait, often swinging tennis racket, and doing rifle-ranging like most Texans. Of these two rivalling admirals, or Yamamoto of the IJN's and Nimitz of the USN's Pacific Fleet, there had been number of surprising similarities as well as dissimilarities.

Of these, the first to be taken up by me is of course, those of Admiral Yamamoto's.

One of the most striking behavior in the life of Admiral Yamamoto's, was the consumptive love of all sorts of gambling games; yes, indeed, from chess through checker to Gho or Shogi, no sooner had Admiral found time to chat with anyone than, he would start talking about gamblings and various games. These complete obsessions into the gambling behaviors are of a psychological import of the first roder in my analyses of the man. Moreover, had we taken it after the fashion of entitling Dostewsky's study being entitled "Dostoevsky in Roulette," by Füllep Miller, we can speak of Admiral Yamamoto's as "Yamamoto aboard the Yamato in Shogi." The fact that this sort of reference would not be a game of the non wit can be backed up if we take a special note to the former Petty Officer Omi's exposé. This NCO had been one of the most trusted orderlies to Admiral Yamamoto. According to his confession or reveal, even when a report after a report of our defeated news came up in quantities, Yamamoto had been seen kept engrossed in his Shogi-playing with one of his fond staff officers Commander Watanabe, ejaculating in between, "Gee! Another one of ours hit by the enemy?"

Even to this day, the prevalent air among us is such that people tend to ignore or dismiss this exposé by Omi as if it were an unnecessary appendix. But this kind of attitude is ruinous to our future illumination inasmuch as these overall commander's finger-tips and their non-ceasing movement should have betrayed or been betraying the very inner psyche of the admiral himself, like fast revolving gyroscopic ring.

The fact that psychic as well as psychological, and for that matter, much more important psychoanalytical depth meanings had been coagulatedly hidden, but had been betrayed in his finger-tip fixations that went so far as to express them compulsively and unconsciously could be pointed out. Thus his never ceasing finger-tips have been becoming not his mental appendix, but the true index or index
finger to the depths psychology of Admiral Yamamoto.

Just why the Yamamoto's operations from the PHA to Midway and through the Guadalcanal campaigns to his final consummation must have been of the very stereo-typed Wiederholungen's (Recapitulations or repetitions)? When challenged on the gounds of inherent dangers in repeating the same kind of surprise attack method, Admiral brushed them off, saying "So long as the surprise element's maintained, nothing bad would occur!" Just how very subjective this sort of wistful thinking is, seems so transparent even to us the non-professional sailor; but as it had turned out the dangers of repetition seem not to have affected the admiral in the least degree! In a sharp contrast, Admiral Nimitz's operations had been all based on the principle of "Calculated Risk-taking," thus betraying the historical facts that the American risk-takings had been contained within the scope of the Westerner's objective, probabilistic sort.

To add further supporting evidences in this line of psychological similarity and dis-similarity analyses, let me point-introduce the following as the very guide-line marker.

Nimitz had been known, along with his subordinate Raymond Spruance, as a steady pace-setting stroller. On the other hand, Admiral Yamamoto was known among his confidantes as frequent imitator of "Charlie Chaplain's" weirdly comical hopping gait. In case of the latter, funmaking acts would keep popping even after he had become the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet. To be sure, there have been a number of admirers of Yamamoto who would dismiss these trîfles as indeed of trifles, and nothing of these would clarify the very issues. But from psychic as well as psychological points, the facts that the man past the age of fifty, the chosen maritime gurdian of the Imperial Japan should have been dancing in alleys like a Charlie Chaplain, and pulling off the chair from the long-tongued General Tojyo and making him land on his buttocks, these Yamamoto circuses seem to have been hidden behind his comical or practical joking masquerades, Compulsive "Zwang!" Even as a partial mid-way conclusion, I had to admit the presence of an idiosyncratic temperament in the person of the admiral; that was; he could not help shocking other people by showing these extraordinary antics, not just at the peace time, but at the PHA, the Midway, and at the Bougainville air, with the terminal piece of these psychic antics which he had been kept showing to his friend and foe alike. From this point of
reasoning, even his manner of death could have been the last piece of his anticarian mental chessboard, the once-for-all final move of his chip movings of his life-long puzzle-completion want. Of this point, I would take up from other angles as this thesis proceeds.

**Asthenic, schizoid-type Captain Kameto Kuroshima**

(1893 – 1965), the *Phantom* at the Combined Fleet's HQ

**versus**

Super rationally tempered "Soc" McMoriss,

the *Phantom* at the CincPac HQ

It should be recalled that by the time the so-called Indian ops, and Coral Sea Operations had been on, the Staff HQ of the Combined Fleet had been shifted, on Feb. 22, 1942, from the battleship *Nagato* to the superdreadnought *Yamato*, nicknamed as "Yamato Hotel," for her ultrasuperb accommodations. Succeeding the formerly flagships *Nagato* and *Mutsu*, this brand-new *Yamato* had been entirely air-conditioned. In a word these staff officers, with charismatic Admiral Yamamoto on their top, were lulled as if they were a Caesar-and-Cleopatra pair in the *Punkha*-leaved luxuries. But even in the midst of this Yamato-hotel like luxuries, there lived a strange phantom, whose name and title was Captain Kameto Kuroshima and Senior Staff Officer at the Combined Fleet's HQ aboard the *Yamato*, so exceedingly favored and trusted by the C-in-C Yamamoto that Captain had been allowed to come and go like a post-war American hippie in his attires and manners. As the consequences, his nickname among officers and men aboard became the *Phantom Staff Officer*. Quite by accident, Nimitz's senior staff officer Capatain "Soc" McMoriss had been called "Phantom," too, with its origin coming from *The Phantom at the Opera* association.

According to the description by E. B. Potter, Nimitz's biographer, the latter's having got such the funny name as the Phantom is not so much of the junior officers' malicious slandering of him, but based on the simple association of his non-descript figure. But the fact that this officer had allowed the unlucky omen number in the Western civilization as that of the 13th for the carrier striking force of Admiral Halsey and moreover its sortie day scheduled on the very 13th, Friday, cannot be dismissed
even as a joke, a practical joke of at least something nearing an ill-wishing, or unconscious but malicious intent, can be inferred.

Had these unlucky numbering or number fixation been allowed to fit, despite Halsey's strong protest lined with his Chief of Staff Captain Miles Browning's strong protest, the conduct of the USN's would have been judged no differing from that of the IJN's and of Kuroshima-directed pile-ups of the ill-omened 4s as revealingly betraying in the records of the MI (DWAY) operations.

It should be remembered that time and again even that Halseian Radom Yamaguchi had begged to postpone the day of the Midway operations so as to give his officers and men enough rest.

But the Phantom Staff Kuroshima refused to budge, saying "The C-in-C Combined Fleet does not like to change the operational details once they've been decided."

It may be that Captain Kuroshima's over jealous insistence of the fixed date the assemblage of the 4 big carriers on the 4th day of June, might well have been aimed at the deliberate identification of these numbers to the birthday date of no other than his superior Admiral Yamamoto's own birth day, or April 4 of the year 1884. As you might easily see even the Western calendared four digits fell on the 4s–!

Indeed such the thinking might have been the plausible case in point; if so, so far as the psyche of Captain Kuroshima was concerned, these deliberate tripling or even quadrupling of number 4 were turned into good omens, nothing to be hussed about by the ordinary officers and lowly ratings, so figured Kuroshima.

Though I have been entertaining the so-called No. 4 theory for a long time, the basic structure of the number 4-omen is nothing new to the most Japanese; in fact, many foreign missionaries whose good part of lives had been spent in this country are aware of them just as in the Western counterpart of the unluckey Friday 13th omen. What is important, however, is the very fact that this number had crisscrossed appeared in the wakes of the IJN's so-called glorious history that I myself had been lured into a very special study of these, and as its result I have come to my astonished realization that the numbers have taken their death tolls in the twists and turns of the IJN until its defunction on the 15th August, 1945.

The Existence of The Unlucky 4-omens that had crisscrossed the entire wakes of the now-defunct Imperial Japanese Navy.

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That birthday, the day on which it had usually thought to bring one a lucky day, or at least had been as lucky signs, had been turning out a series of misfortunes for no other than our Yamamoto; now in the case of Yamamoto's successor Admiral Koga, his birth day, to be sure, did not fall on the 4th of the 4th month; never-the-less, even Koga's life had been ominously bound up to the unluckiness of the 4th number; in fact, even this admiral disappeared aboard the 4-motored flying boat and lost in April 1st of 1944, for ever, but one theory has it that having been captured by Phillipino guerrillas but rescued by the Japanese army garrison on the island he had only to kill himself on the very fateful day, or June 4th (3rd anniversary of the Midway debacle), 1944!

In case of Yamamoto, its first known appearance occurred on the 4th month of 4th year of Showa (1929) for the then Captain Yamamoto, at the time commanding the aircraft carrier Akagi. It so happened that due to an unusually thick fog which developed off the Saishuto, he had come to lose all the aircraft ordered by him for a routine flight.

Next occurrence, was the so-called 4th Fleet Incident, in which the Tokugata (Special Type) destroyers Hatsuyuki and Yugiri happened to have lost their respective bows, due to the horrendous crests of the typhoon waves; it was said that the entire fleet had rammed into the 4th phase of the typhoon storms; so that ignoring the weather forecaster's warnings the doomed fleet had on its own rushed into the region where the storms would rage most furiously.

Inasmuch as these Tokugata destroyers had been believed to be of the most seaworthy class, consternations they had felt were fathomless. Moreover, what had made the situation worst was the fact that of these two hapless ships, the destroyer Hatsuyuki was carrying in her bows all kinds of codes and ciphers with which the IJN would fight with its hypothetical enemies or USN or USSRN! Now in the case of the destroyer Yugiri her severed bows went down almost as fast as its severance, but in case of Hatsuyuki they did not.

Alas, the Hatsuyuki's bows did not sink instantly but began to drift away from the locale and off the Fourth Fleet; all kinds of rescue endeavours had failed and finally the Fourth Fleet Command shelled the doomed bows into the ocean depths.

Quite by accident, the Chief of the Investigation Board happened to be that Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, the very same man who was to become the 1940–41

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ambassador of Japan to America, at that tumulting pre-Pearl days. Moreover, the same Fourth Fleet's Investigation Board Committee included such familiar names as Vice Admiral Yamamoto and Rear Admiral Koga on its list! The fateful year in which this tragic incident occurred was the year 1935. One of the latter officers, Koga was the very man who was to succeed Admiral Yamamoto at his death as C-in-C of the Combined Fleet. And if the writer reiterates, this same Koga happened to have died in April 1st, 1944, having boarded the 4-motored flying boat that took off the Palau islands, on the 31st of March, 1944.

It is more than significant to recall the fact that Yamamoto had been caught in the snares of the unlucky No. 4's can be easily deduced in his Chief-of-Staff Vice Admiral Ugaki's war-time diaries. The following words on the day or June 4th, 1942 (5th in the Japanese dating) was recorded; but inasmuch as the area the forces deployed was beyond the 180 degrees international date changing line, the Japanese had lost the 4 carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu) on the fourth day! The following words voiced by Admiral Yamamoto betray beyond doubt, Yamamoto had been awakened to the past ordeal of the Fourth Fleet in the annals of the IJN as though virtual example of "The Persistence of Memory," by Dalí's. It is betraying in the very words voiced at the Yamato's bridge by Admiral Yamamoto himself as follows:

"Had the crippled Akagi fallen into the enemy hands, disadvantages would be almost fathomless. Akagi's immediate scuttling be advised. In the year of Showa 10th (1935) during big maneuvers, the Fourth Fleet had run into a giant storm, and one destroyer whose severed bows might have contained living souls had been sunk by our own shelling under the command of Rear Admiral Komatsu..."

This very fact that in the midst of the Midway debacle, Admiral was fast utilizing the example of the past tragedy, moreover of the Fourth Fleet's, is betraying beyond any doubt that his associative power was raised to the level of the unlucky number 4 omen's.

Out of the Midway debacle, one other anecdote is sticking out rather like a sore thumb.

That was Captain Kuroshima's wailing wishes that the carrier Akagi's scuttling be
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spared. This same officer was to act far more strangely even at the very heights of the Guadalcanal campaign to the effect that he had deliberately tried to delay the sinking of the battleship *Hiei*. What Captain Kuroshima had proposed twice on separate occasions did feed an extra coal to the existing fiasco and availed the friendly force nothing.

In each case, it was the good fight on the fleets as well as Yamamoto’s Chief of Staff Ugaki’s steadfast decisions and wise advices that saved Yamamoto from the total disgrace. Although this can be a model example of the wise-after-the-event thinking, one fact remains clearly that Captain Kuroshima’s can hardly be considered *Empfindsamkeitinsel* (An isle for one’s emotional soothing), even though this officer’s name in the Chinese characters certainly did contain the word island in its *shima* part.

For all these surface matters, why did the Fourth Fleet Incident of some seven year’s past float up into the conscious level of Admiral Yamamoto, in the welter of the Midway debacles? The readers whose over-bearing perseverances had endured my reading may have been tired out of the recapitulation of the same numbered things, but to square the facts already mentioned, let me quote few poems out of the *Manyoshu*, that time-honoured volume of ten-thousand leaves (words) anthology as follows:

25) *Hatsuyuki* (First Fall of the Season’s Snow!)

Fall, fall on in thousand droplets.
Look at them in deep meditations
As in the deep mountainside’s funeral flowers,
I wish to creep across the void to thee!

26) *Yugiri* (In the evening fog that rose)

Birds’ charpings have been heard,
Along the *Saho* road.
That must’ve been much ruined for sight!

Before going into the meditation of the above two poems, I would like to call the readers’ especial attention to one other poem that is tucked into a space between the two ones just mentioned. It goes as follows:
Jiro Anzai

As the Okuyama's (interior mountain's)  
Shikimi flowers,

I wish to cling and weep after you!

Its starting line is betraying one's wishes to go beyond this world. Shikimi is a shrub as well as flower often associated with the graveyard or Buddhistic funerals. Moreover, the person like Admiral Yamamoto whose mental faculty is strong in associative power might have read the very Chinese characters horizontally and if he had done so, the same word can be rendered Ki-Mitsu meaning Ultra-Secret.

And thus, he might have been easily recalling not only the Fourth Fleet's debacle, but the very sinking of the desoroyer Hatsuyuki's doomed bows that had come to be dealt with the gun fire, so as to keep the code secrecy for ever.

To be sure the same unlucky 4 omen not only did the service to the US Navy but availed it greatly. For at the Wake Island campaign a couple of Grumman F-4-F fighters played a havoc among the Japanese invaders, sinking one Japanese destroyer, setting afire the shipload of depth charges and damaging other shippings. The island's shore battery blew apart another destroyer at the distance of 4-thousand meters off the island. It should be recalled, furthermore, that on the Wake Island Campaign alone the Fourth Fleet had lost 4 ships, with its aim repulsed until the island's defense had come overpowered by the carrier plane's strength dispatched from Admiral Yamaguchi's 2nd Air Fleet (that was on its all-victorious journey back from the Hawaiian campaign).

The unlucky Fourth Fleet also kept running into the foul omen weather in that at the Coral Sea battle, the same Fourth Fleet again took the very punishment, with the carrier Zuikaku losing most of their veteran pilots and planes, and the carrier Shokaku receiving three direct bomb hits on her deck, not to mention of lives lost. Moreover, the heavy damages inflicted on the two carriers had come to rob the hitherto-all-powerful Nagumo Forces' six-carrier strength of the said two, thus making their numbers to that omened 4-carrier strength! But the Nagumo forces so fed up on the victory disease had never dreamed of their own complete defeat.

Thus, long before the Midway Operations got started, available full-carrier strength had been whittled down to the level of the ominous number 4! And yet who, indeed, on the Japanese side, had been truly aware of the very fingers of God that

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would tell the end of the forces and their downfall? None but God can.

For all the above, had you been the avid reader of the Manyoshu, especially its twentieth volume, the volume abound with warriors' as well as their wives' poems, you might have guessed that none other than Yamamoto should have been assailed with some inkling; for in that warriors-congested volume there are two poems crowned with the very words as Hatsuyuki and Yugiri, the same words that had been painted on the bows of the two hapless destroyers sank in the Fourth Fleet Incident, back in 1935!

It is, therefore, more than a mere chance possibility that our Admiral had been rudely awakened to the omen-numbered 4th or Death-tolling numerosity.

Those Western-hemisphered readers might say that it is nothing new to the sailor or seaman; in fact, even that manly hero Admiral Halsey had made the CincPac HQ change the naming of his own carrier task force from the 13th to 16th, and even the date of the sortie from the 13th Friday to other innocuous date. This anecdote, though seems fishy, turns out to be more than true.

This fact, moreover, proves beyond any doubt the true commandship in the person of Admiral Halsey, in that he had exerted every faculty of his if he could have secured any element of security as well as good faith of his men under his command.

Thumbsucking Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (1887 – 1944)

versus

Serenely spinning top-like Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi
(1892 – 1942) and, Taciturn, slow strolling, but fast decision
takable Raymond Spruance (1886 – 1969)

We should recall the historical fact that the Kidobutai (Mobile Force) consisted of several aircraft carriers, along with a pair of battleships, several cruisers and some fifteen destroyers, came into being only in April of the year 1941. Its very idea was not innovated by Nagumo, but by Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa (1886 – 1966), and yet the very commander of the said Kidobutai had been none other than Admiral Nagumo, despite the lingering ill feelings of his chief Yamamoto to his nomination, why this had come out is even now shrouded in the airs of mystery. Why Yamamoto that had
hated both his Chief of Staff Ugaki and Nagumo for their respective hystereses, had kept them on these key jobs that were bound to decide the fate of the IJN and Imperial Japan, has remained even to this date the biggest enigma.

Now back to the Midway study proper, it is not difficult to see that the sortie for the First Air Fleet or the Nagumo's Carrier Striking Force was made on the 27th of May, 1942, the 37th anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima, May 27, 1905.

In retrospections, Nagumo force had swept around the globe, navigated some 50,000 sea miles since the start of the Pacific War, and even the PHA excluded, they had come to sink the British aircraft carrier Hermes, heavy cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall off the Ceylon, and one destroyer and as many numbers of transports, and downed several hundreds of enemy aircraft, knocked out countless base and ground installations. As these easy victories secured, even as they sped on their way to the new operations, nearly all the officers and men were calculating in terms of their winning chances, dreaming nothing but onesided victories. So they had looked.

Thus, on their midway towards the doomed (so we had thought) Island, men and officers alike kept singing like a group of school boys, kept singing completely absorbed in victorious dreams from the past and oft for the glorious near future. So immersed had they been in that mood victorious, so hallowed in the bright beams of the setting sun, even when the surrounding seas began to reflect shimmering gold and purple glitters from the setting sun's rays, most men and officers aboard the striking forces had hardly been aware of their Commander Vice Admiral Nagumo's finger-tips or thumb had been stuck into his mouth, betraying quantities of anxiety which he had hidden behind his wry face (nicknamed "crab" by his daughter). Moreover, some of those men recently transferred to the carrier duty was so overjoyed that they were herad singing the "Song of the Trans-oceanic Bomber Corps," whose theme was lauding the feat of the aerial adventure in the Sino-Japanese war, the feat accomplished by the flight of the Navy's Type 96 twin-engined/twin ruddered "Nell" attackers, (bombs/torpedoes carrying) land-based medium craft.

Thus, even as his young officers and men were at the heights of their rising spirits, a finger or two or thumb had been sucked into the mouth of that stern-faced commander. So unlike behavior for him you might say, but it was part of this otherwise tough-faced commander's almost unconscious behavioral pattern when under stress.
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To be sure, Nagumo had not been a lone figure in our history's turning points, as the thumbsucker. For that matter, Lord Ieyasu (1542–1616) our history's far greater turning pointer was also a thumb sucker. (Some says even Fletcher had been of a thumb sucker. But I do not know of its authenticity.) But of the maedieval Lord Ieyasu's finger tips fixation, there have been a number of records including the Tokugawa dynastys' own records that tell that this had been more than true. "Lord honorable Ieyasu when in crises of war, had his thumb stuck into his mouth . . . ."

For all these trifles, Lord Ieyasu was the true warrior that went on to have the entire Japan conquered under him, and saw seeds that lasted the Tokugawa dynastys for some 250 years. Compared to the Ieyasu's fate, the life of Admiral Nagumo turned out not just one defeat at the Midway, but another one on the island of Saipan that had come to be crushed by the very USN under the command of the now Vice Admiral Raymond Spruance (1886–1969).

But I am not inclined to pass a hasty judgement on his person just because he had been beaten twice by Spruance, but because his bio thoroughly examined should betray historico-psychological implications of the first order.

The psychic as well as psychological hysteresis in the person of Lord Ieyasu had been betraying in that fond epigrammic phrase, is in my view very amply witnessed; which in turn signifies Ieyasu's person and his psychic temperament i.e., "When the bird refuses to sing, let's wait till she feels like singing." This mood was indeed ideal for Lord Ieyasu's person, who had been said of his crossing even the sturdy-looking stone bridge only after dismounting his horse and testing its security by four limbs.

In contrast to the temperament and tempo of his, the modern aircraft carrier striking force's commander Nagumo's lot was of the faster thinking and quicker action-demanded man, whose bounden duties require the very fitness for the twinkling moment's decision and execution of it once decided.

Thus, even though my following reasoning can be a typical wise-after-the-event kind, the fast thinking Rear Admiral Yamaguchi (1892–1942) should have taken the surviving Nagumo's post. For all that, another query might arise; why Nagumo, who had been the last son among the six-childrened family, should have come up with the fore-mentioned fingertip fixation? Being the last son of a big family, he should have been much loved and well pampered, thus leaving no room for the occurrence of nail biting or thumbsucking. One plausible answer I could offer is; his mother must have
been too busy in farming and other cares for elderly but sickly kins that she had little time left for breast feedings for this last son. At any rate, the fact of Admiral Nagumo’s temper and tempo had not been so well suited to the split-secondary fast decision maker on the aircraft striking force, would have been cleared. Just how hopelessly slow the Nagumo’s decision making is well betraying when we compare his action with that of Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi’s. The fact that the latter had advised his superior Nagumo by means of flag and blinker signals to the effect that “Immediate take-off of the striking forces be made!” is no less important; Yes, indeed, when the cruiser Tone’s No. 4 scout had sent in that urgent flash that it had found what seemed to be ten enemy surface ships …., is now well known. But long before this, the same Yamaguchi had dispatched his concerns to the Nagumo HQ as follows: Having considered the ways by which the enemy’s been pouncing on us, the presence of enemy aircraft carriers be suspected. Be on the double alert!"

This warning of the most decisive nature that would have saved the Nagumo HQ from tragic defeat had been issued from that moon-faced, Chinese doll-like soft mouth of Yamaguchi. Yes, indeed, fatty and muscullarily strong physiqued, he had hid behind his facade, the presence of gyroscopic whirls of fast thinking mind.

Of Vice Admiral Ugaki’s stubborn second-to-none attitude, much has been spoken by others, but as a psychologist I have something more to say for his keeping such a defense mechanisimic behavioral pattern. Indded, his having received as his nick-name "Golden Mask" due to his not-even-a-muscle-twitching facial facade keeping, would strike me as the model case of a psychological Panzer (armor plate) wearing. It seems that through some unknown past hysteresis this admiral must have come to adapt on his face that kind of frozen mask; brilliant he had been throughout his career, somehow, somewhere, he had taken upon him that mental armor-plating so as not to betray his inner psyche.

Despite this mental lid placing of self-imposed nature, Admiral Ugaki had left us, the navy-minded posterior, that fat tome, volume after volume of war records that could betray his inner feelings and emotions, not to speak of details of those command structures and command decisions of the Combined Fleet.

Though the following excerpt from the above-mentioned source in my humble English translation is a bit off our present Midway account, as it being a page from his later day of duty, or during his last hitch as the Commander of the Fifth Air Fleet,
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then stationed at Kanoya, Kyushu, Japan, it should be by its own contents quite illuminating or well projecting his inner mind. It goes as follows:

At the send-off of the last night's suicide attackers intending to strike at the US fleet assembled at Ulithi atolls, I had been able to send them off with smiles, not even a flicker of anxieties showing on my face; this was not because of my having grown insensitive to their ordeals, but because I've been bowing to myself that I too would go into their wakes.

It should be remembered that only several months after the above entry had been made, Admiral Ugaki did depart on his self-appointed suicide mission, on August 15, 1945, or on the last day of the Imperial Japanese Navy and of the Imperial Japan.

Thus, the sincerity of his words as well as his inner had been well-underlined in his own deeds. And due to this detailed accountings by his pen, we the posteriors and outsiders could learn much. From this Belesenheit (reading career) I have come to deplore of the unbridgeable gap that had existed between Ugaki, Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, and his overall Commander and C-in-C Admiral Yamamoto. He had had no warm-hearted communications with his Chief. In another word, Chief of Staff Admiral Ugaki had been left out of the tent, so to speak, as if an outsider, and his subordinate to be Kuroshima and his very protector Admiral Yamamoto had been acting like a foliè à deux (paired fools on a ship of fools, aboard the Yamato).

Yet, to the outsiders, Ugaki's figure had been looming as Chief of Staff for the victorious Yamamoto party, but to those insiders or the naval officers in the know, the very Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet had been considered "a persona non grata." Yes, indeed, to one staff officer of other unit, who had paid a courtesy visit to Ugaki, he had confided as follows:

"I've been looked up as Yamamoto's Cheif of Staff, but in reality the war's been being conducted by Yamamoto-san and Kuroshima alone together!"

Not a room for Ugaki to muck in was the true situation. And while confiding this astonishing fact, Ugaki could not very well hide a rueful look hovering on his otherwise Golden-mask face!
Compared to the above-mentioned sorry state in which the IJN's Combined Fleet's Chief of Staff had been caught, the lot allocated for the rivalling Nimitz's CincPac Staff Chief Rear Admiral Draemel's had been far fared. For Draemel had been also of the black-shoed, destroyer flotilla careered man before he had been appointed to the post. But inasmuch as the post-Midway campaigns had been so air-minded ones, tin-can navied Draemel, and Theobald (Commander of the Destroyer flotilla of the PHA period, and then of the Aleutian campaign) had been hard pressed. For any further conduct of the Pacific war had been necessitatedly called for the wit and wisdom of the multidimensional warfares, in which the air-minded experiences should have prevailed.

Such the thinking might have been the case in point, but so far as the psyche of Captain Kuroshipa was concerned, he should have been so completely negating the possibility of the unwelcome association of the number 4 (Shi) with another homo-phonic Shi (死) or Death in Japanese. To be sure, most of the Japanese had been brought up to laugh off at such the weakling association as the most un-warrior-like stuff. Nevertheless, most human beings would be perturbed when they were left alone in their own room, or in the narrow niche of their own psyche, under the spells of such the negative spirits, even the mere numbering might have a damaging influence. The neurotic as well as normal might lose precious hours of sleep, thus despite their will and wishes to pep up their fighting spirits, physical and mental fitness as well. Thus, we need to reconsider the possible effect of these ill-omened numberings upon the persons and personalities of both the navies, as to the very Wiederholungen (Recapitulations) of threatening nature of the numbers 4 and 13.

The fact that this kind of assumption is of practical importance, had been amply displayed when we have reconsidered the actions taken by Admiral Halsey with a strong protest to his superior Admiral Nimitz's HQ, which had caused the CincPac to change the very task force's originally allocated number 13 to 16, and the scheduled sortie date of Friday 13, to Saturday 14! In a word, the USN that had been considered of the utmost rationality-oriented, (when compared to the irrational and intuitive IJN's inhuman keeping of the fixed date and other details), had considered their fleet's welfare and morale upkeeping as the matter of the foremost.

In contrast to the above-mentioned Halsey/Nimitz's conduct of war and their leadership, Yamamoto's cold shoulderning to the Kidobutai, and his right-hand man
Captain Kuroshima's brushing off or stamping down their men's earnest request and wishes stood out almost as sore thumb. Kuroshima's retort to the effect that "The C-in-C of the Combined Fleet would not like the re-making of the once-decided operation plans" sadly reminds us the ancient tragedy of harsh exploitations administered to the younger half-brother Yoshitsune (1159–1189) and his weary men by his elder brother Yoritomo (1147–1199) in our maedieval days, and their historic actions in the ancient Genji and Heike clans' epic stories, were introduced here for a comparative sketch.

The essentially same situation had come to the Nagumo's Kidobutai through the sinister counsel of Captain Kuroshima, so becoming to Yoritomo's war counselor Lord Kajiwara, the cruel and bureaucratic man.

Now back to Captain Kuroshima of the IJN and Colonel Tsuji of the IJA (Imperial Japanese Army) I can even add up another Schizophrenic Bildstreifendenken man, that was no other than Adolf Hitler (1889–1945). It so happened that all these were the ones that had planned and executed a series of multi-phased operations, in a running commentary fashion of a folie à deux (paired fools) or even trio, as if all of their minds had been seized in the fits of Bildstreifendenken way.

The phenomenon had been originally seen in relations to those images appearing to dreamers, right after their sinking into a semi-arousal state, or just before their awaking from the dreaming sleep. These phenomena had come to be designated under the said term Bildstreifendenken, because they who had been experiencing a succession of dream contents, feeling as if each and separate items had been projected on the TV news hours or in cinematic news reels, as though in a continuous whole. For the normal minds, even as in the midst of those dreams, some degree of irrationality's been felt through, and quickly faded soon after the waking, but those on the boderline seem to feel very strongly those separate things as the wholly sequential entities. Thus, to Kuroshima, Tsuji, or Hitler, operations must have been of those multi-phased phantasmagoric, ballet-like, and "cock-eyed."

Thus, those dreamers in the inner psychic process of Bildstreifendenken stage tend to see them as a sequentially or spatially connected whole, however weird or phantasmagoric they actually were; these seem the very key to uncover the enigma of such colossally backsliding operations, by the above-mentioned trios.

No less important failure in the fact recognition had been occurring in our
Midway operations; that was the steadfast refusal of our intelligence people who had refused to recognize the plausibility of our code and cipher leakage.

The fact to the effect that the IJN had come to lose the decisive Midway operations so devastatingly to the Inferior-strengthened USN had never been taken as the very lesson for us. This very devastating loss had been incurred due to the total lack of the ultra secret keeping to the friendly forces scattered all over the Pacific, thus without realizations their tripling or quadrupling the degree of vulnerability to the American intelligence, seemed not to have aroused our minding of code secrecy and security keeping. In my view the very reason of these strategic defeats and debacles had occurred due to the very acts of seminating our ultra secret by means of radio, instead of sealed-enveloped courier methods. Thus, the Kuroshima/Yamamoto's paired folly in Bildstreifendenken had come to enlarge the vulnerable flanks to the HYPO (US Naval Intelligence Center, Oahu, Hawaii) and OP-G 2–20 (Washington's Naval Intelligence Center).

In reiterating, the IJN had come to lose that decisive Midway battle to the USN, due mainly to the very want of seminating the import and implications of the vital operations details to all the fleet elements deployed, what amounted to have been in multi-phased Bildstreifendenken and in so doing they had to depend on the Japanese ultra secret semination by means of radio instead of sealed enveloped courier transmissions. There are some Americans that had thought this heavy use of radio communication as to the detailed operational knowledge in itself was a duping thrown by us for the Americans.

The above reasoning to be sure is quite contrary to the already widespread notion that the American victory had been a narrow one, that the very ultra secret of the Japanese navy had been so difficult that only about one third or so had been legible, that the war might have been entirely lost, if that delay in switching to the new version had not been effected.

Those sayings at first sight seems very plausible, but if we retrospect on why so much hush-hush had been kept so long after the cessation of the WW II, the real truth seems to have been lying in the realm of highly political weather talks, of which I am in the least qualified to explore.

So changing the subjects, but still keeping to the cryptic analysis, I would like to call the readers attention to novelist and ex-IJN intelligence officer Hiroyuki Agawa's
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data-laden book entitled “Warship Nagato”, whose contents had stimulated me to further this line. According to this nonfiction book, the battleship Nagato, when pre-paring her for the Leyte Gulf campaign in the mid 1944, went so far as to jettison Judo tatami mats so as to increase her fire-proof security, and yet she kept a couple of black-boxed Type 97 Crypto machines. When the occasion and time were such that they had been forced to throw away the fond Judo-practice tatami, why they had to keep the “useless” crypto machines for this coming sortie? The very comment by the code officer in charge to the effect that these machines had been so full of bugy and considered useless, seems to me of the contrary, cover statement, that those ultra crypto machines should have been used until the last day of the IJN’s defunction. Incorporating this bit of otherwise what seems a trifle information I went on to comment in my Battle of Midway — A Psychological Account as follows:

The fact that the year 1903 in which the British detective story writer Conan Doyle (1859 – 1930)’s cryptographic work “Dancing Men” appeared coincided with the birth of the Wright Brothers’ gasoline engined flight into the air in America is also of a techno-culturally important novelty’s; incidentally the year 1903 is also the year on which Jiro Horigushi (1903 – 1982), the designer of the Zero fighter that had much to do in the Battle of Midway, was born.

Now back to the Midway battle proper, with especial references to the rivalling intelligence efforts, I would like to call the reader’s attention to the following excerpt by Ugaki in his famed diary. On the 31st of May, 1942, his diary entry read as follows:

In the afternoon message from Honolulu station to merchant ships at sea, the weather conditions of Dutch Harbor and Codiac are sent out. We consider these as of the highly significant....

To reconsider the above-mentioned precious info, we could observe that even among the victory-diseased IJN’s officers and men aboard the Combined Fleet’s vessels that had been put to sea, at least Vice Admiral Ugaki had been awaken to the message’s import. This is no other than an indication that some had been in a state of sentinel’s readiness; at some auxilliary supply forces or troops transpots that had been
advancing into the areas, some had anticipated of the coming danger.

To be precise, this sort of pre-scientific behavior or action had not been limited to the above-mentioned quarters. Some of our invading forces, even though coming out of the now Japanese occupying Guam and the mandate Saipan, had deliberately taken the 180-degree turns so as to masquerade their Midway-bound base course; alas, they not only had been spotted by the American subs, (this supposition had been made possible for the lengthy signal had been heard issuing from the position on the far forwardly open sea, that was far ahead of our advancing occupation forces).

Frustrating was the facts that the Japanese could not read these coded radio messages from these enemy subs.

Another fore-warning signs had been secured by our patrol planes that had been sent out on their daily patrols.

Compared to these sorry states by us on the whereabouts of the US submarines, the American intelligence had been supplying quantities of accurate infos due to their excellent abilities of code cracking.

But much more stirring informations had been out, on the pages of Chicago Tribune right after the Battle of Midway.

This tragicomical event was underlined by the fact that Lieutenant Commander Segliman's abrupt and extraordinary conduct. His promotion had been rudely stopped because of his careless spilling of the US intelligence's opportune fore-knowing of the coming Midway operations to their many details. Crowning the entire issue was the unexpected severity of tongue lashing that had come from Premier Winston Churchill across the Atlantic. We've been indoctrinating you Americans by our tears and blood on the import and implications of the Ultra Secret keeping, must have been at the very root of his rage. And yet why the US that had kept Britain fighting due to the Lendlease acts and quantities of American weapons, foods and other vital war carrying munitions, could have been scolded by Churchill, as if the proud American tops were naughty children?

For all that, neither the Japanese nor other Axis nations' agents seemed not to have noticed of this near exposé of the vital Ultra secret leakage by Segliman.

It is, in my assumption, the person of Premier Churchill, and of his powerful Charismatic weights that bulldozered into FDR and his right-hand man Harry Hopkins, for their starting the overpowering cult of the Ultra Secret methods in
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America. In a word, it was no other than Churchill that had succeeded to hypnotize Roosevelt and his right-hand man Hopkins. The end result was that “Don’t let the general populace or public alarmed” epigrammatic ending statements that would follow in almost nearly all the secret dispatches and orders issued from Washington.

(To Be Continued)

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11) Ibid., p. 61.
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