From Copenhagen to Coventry

— A hypothetical attempt at solving

the so-called Pearl Harbor riddles (Ill) —

Jiro Anzai

Fas es eto ab hoste doceri

There can be found no room for negating the fact that on the 7th of December in 1941, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884–1943), the Commande-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Combined Fleet, did attack Pearl Harbor, the then presumed bastion of the Pacific Defense, and work havoc upon the so-called Battleship Row of the United States Navy’s Pacific Fleet. This fact remains as an undeniable fait accompli, indeed; but the questions of how this dare-devil attack had come about, especially of enigmas generated out of criss-crossing politico-historical events and their implications leading up to the Pearl Harbor Attack per se, are still wanting in the very endeavors of supplying sufficiently reasonable answers for the so-called Pearl Harbor Attack enigmas.

For all that, there indeed can be no space for doubting the historic fact that the concept of coup de main had been hatched in the minds of Admiral Yamamoto and his fond senior staff officer Rear Admiral Kameto Kuroshima (1893–1965), with their executed coup nullifying the pet theory of hitherto greatly-cherished “Fleet-in-Being” by President Franklin Delano Roovevelt (1882–1945) and his fond senior staff officer, Chief of Naval Oprations Admiral Harold Stark (1880–1972); needless to say, the very execute of the Fleet-in-Being had been quite stubbornly pushed forwards by the above-mentioned President and his party so concerned to and upon the Pacific Fleet and its former C-in-C Admiral J.O. Richardson until he had been ousted out of the role to be replaced with the illfated Admiral Husband Kimmel.

Some people, especially the non-revisionists group, may shun away or shut their
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eyes on the following arguments which the writer of this article is about to offer; nevertheless, he would like to remind all parties of the existence of a Roman proverb that *fas es eto ab hoste doceri* (it is right to be taught by an enemy; you may get a hint from the other side), and of its possible use or even worth in the case of re-examining the Pearl Harbor Attack and its enigmas.

For one thing, if I may be permitted to pronounce, the question of whether that infamous attack instigated by our naval persons (including Admiral Nomura, the then ambassador to the United States of America) had been a genuine *coup de main* or not, has not yet been completely settled, thus requiring all concerned to carefully scrutinize all the previous facts or evidences or suppositions including those newly discovered ones.

What ho! What ho! This fellow is dancing mad! He hath been bitten by the Tarantula. — From Samuel Butler's *All in the Wrong*

The Taranto Harbor Attack as the Instigator of Psychic Hysteresis into All Parties that had been in the Wrong

Before he would go into a detailed discourse, the writer of this article would like to say a few words about the implication of the above-mentioned epigram which Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849), a famous American poet and a creator of the so-called mystery novel, inserted into the little space just below the title letters *Gold Bug* (1843). The fact that this concise master-piece happens to be one of the *pièce de résistance* of cryptographic literature along with the British counter-part's *Dancing Men* (1903) by Conan Doyle (1859–1930), may be passed without any notice by the common populace, but the same bespeaks of a certain symbolic implication for those whose interests are in the realm of military or naval histories, especially of cryptographic naval warfare.

Inasmuch as no one could deny the importance of the roles played in the World War II by means of cryptography, even the mere introduction, by the above-mentioned American author of the nine–teenth century’s, of Sam Butler’s epigrammatic words from his *All in the Wrong*, seems almost gone beyond the sphere of accidental
happening or of chance symbolization.

For indeed the historic developments of politico–military events which had preceded the Pearl Harbor Attack (executed on the 7th of December of 1941), seem to have betrayed by their own courses or traces the appropriateness of such the inference or implication.

Now that the words Psychic Hysterisis mentioned, the writer of this assey, a historical psychologist himself, would like to add a few words on the concise definiton of the phenomenon just referred to. In short, what the writer meant by the term is as follows: it can be said of differing end result (output) out of the person's psyche or individual machine that had received the shocking impact (input) into his or its system, there–after even when outwardly neither person's psyche nor machine's outlook betrays any noticeable surface change, he or it tends to indicate the markedly different output.

Examined in this frame of reference, we cannot but conclude the same finding that of the very important military or naval peoples the world over, there had been none that had not taken in the import of this Taranto Harbor Attack (That British Aeroplane Carrier's Daring Attack on the Italian Battleship Row anchored in the Taranto Harbor, executed on the 11th and 12th of November, 1940, nearly a year and one month before the Pearl Harbor Attack, to be sure).

Yes, indeed, the news of this coup de main flashed to the four corners of the world, electrifying the naval persons of every respectable nation's with re–awakening lessons that that hitherto–seemed–to–have–been–safely–anchored fleet in one's home waters, aided by various anti–air defense systems could hardly guarantee its security, and with enhancing lessons that the value of carrier–born air raids upon the supposedly closely guarded nest of home waters. Of the fact that this coup added a high–octane gasoline into the already brewing fire in the minds of Admiral Yamamoto and his staff officers of the IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy), and that the double–spy Povov was more than activated for his double–channeled mission, others might offer their own asseys.

The point to which the writer of this article would like to draw attention is the electrifying response made by Admiral Harold Stark, the Chief of US Navy's Naval Operations, with the intent of his already betraying in the secret instruction of this high–ranking officer to the Pacific Fleet HQ in Hawaii; of his estimation of the aerial
surprise attacks upon the Fleet-in-being in the Pearl Harbor. For all this, it is very hard for us to be reconciled with the succeeding facts which are to betray the strange shift in the mind of the same Admirl Stark, of the US Navy's coping policy.

In short, why did this same admiral come to the later conclusion of his that repeated warnings of the Japanese dangers to the US Pacific Fleet in the Pearl Harbor was not only unnecessary but more than harmful? Whether you are of the non-revisionist school's or of the revisionist's view holder, does not make any difference here. One striking problem is to be answered: that is; why, indeed why, did the same admiral that had been the prime mover for enhancing the defense of the Pearl Harbor anchorage and the Fleet-in-being there, nearly a year and one month before the coup, come to slacken in his vigilance, when the very hours of danger crept up to his very doors? Indeed, one is so tempted to ask: just what had been the chief cause for his deviation of thinking that went from the apt and prompt response to the danger challenge to the seemingly-devil-mesmerized slackening or deliberate cancelling of the northern patrol sector, of which he had been so aptly lecturing as follows:


Navy Department
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations Washington, 10
February, 1941

From:  The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. In connection with the initial sweep for the Japanese raiders in the Northern Pacific, mentioned in paragraph 5 (7), a suggestion may here be in order. The Chief of Naval Operations believes it possible that Japan for some time maintained a vessel about 500 miles north of Oahu. Implications are that similar vessel is now stationed about 1,000 miles southwest of Oahu. In connection with reports of unidentified
submarines near Oahu, Panama, the Mexican coast, and in the open sea, it may be surmised that the vessel mentioned above is a submarine tender, and that Japan may plan during war to base submarines on the tender in the open sea. It is considered most inadvisable that we indicate too much curiosity in this respect for the time being. It would be well, however, to keep track of such vessels, and to take immediate steps to sink them on the outbreak of war.

5. ............................

6. It is noted that no provision is made in the Naval local Defense plans of the Fourteenth Naval District for the employment of vessels as part of an aircraft warning net in the waters to the northward and southward of Oahu. It is suggested that in coordinating the plans of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, this matter be given consideration. It is possible the large sampans equipped with radio might prove useful for this purpose during the war.

7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available office courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document be registered mail.

/S/ H. R. Stark

The above-mentioned paragraphs are, to be sure, excerpts of the letter dated February 10, 1941, addressed to none other than Admiral Kimmel's Pacific Fleet HQ in Hawaii, Oahu Island, to be exact.

It is a curious fact that the importance of this document, especially with reference to the 6th point enhanced by Admiral Stark, has never drawn attention of any scholar or naval historian. For so far as this 6th point is concerned, it is the same Admiral Stark that had been pointing out: the best possible means of preventing the danger of surprise attack from the Northern Sector of Oahu, and that as early as the date or the 10th of February, 1941, nearly ten months before the Day of Infamy.

The above letter written by Admiral Stark proves beyond the horizon of doubt not just the sanity of this officer, but the existence of a mind that could come to grip the essence of matters.

For all this, there in some quarters are harsh opinions or criticisms which in essence accuse him as the man who had kicked up the C-in-C of the Pacific Fleet and his staff into the attic and took the ladder off it. Had the admiral in question kept up
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his sharp-shooter's eye of discernment up until the day of the PHA, he would not only have saved the Pacific Fleet and its C-in-C Admiral Kimmel from the dishonor, but salvaged his own honor and integrity.

The very fact that the Naval Board had come to censure Stark for his unwise judgement in not sending the pre-attack warnings, and that he had been forced to quit not just the Chief of Naval Operations but eventually to leave the Navy, without the entitled promotion to the five-star admiral, while his counterpart General Marshall had been given the title of five-star general, plus the winner of Nobel Prize for Peace, proves beyond any doubt, that after the debacle of the Pearl Harbor he had been considered by President Roosevelt and his inner circle as the persona non-grata.

Here are a series of facts that prove beyond any speck of doubt that at least in the early half of the year 1941, Admiral Stark had been the formost prophet Isaiah reverse screaming for the coming of the carrier-born wolf pack attacks from the North! Yes, indeed, ever since the successful coup de main on the 11 th of November, 1940 onwards, he had used every available means of communications to inform and instruct the Hawaii of the possible dangers of the aerial bombing and torpedoing by the transpacific raiders.

The Invitation for the Lobster into the Parlor Room

"There is a gap on the corner of the Pentagram which you have drawn," said Mephistopheles. — from Goethe's Faust ——

On hearing the PHA, President Roosevelt went into a prolonged talk for his staff to no end. Some may suppose that this was the way in which the late President tried to fend off not just the blow on the Pearl Harbor but also the very blows on his own ego that was on the brink of collapse. But on his reflection, the writer of this article came to the opinion that it was not the case; instead, the President in question should have been considering the case of the Japanese Attack in line with the national and cultural tradition of that slogan "Remember the Maine!" or in lieu of the more recent case "Remeber the Panay!"

For all that, the riddle still remains unsolved with us; that is the reason why President Roosevelt had been so activated up and against Japan; one of the reasons
which the writer of this article dared to form is the existence of criss-crossing careers of both Admiral Yamamoto's and President Roosevelt's. There are at least three similar paths in each of the reluctant pair that had crossed: (1) Both were Harvard University graduates; (2) while Yamamoto served as a vice-minister for the Japanese Navy, President Roosevelt had been an assistant secretary to the US Navy; (3) Yamamoto happened to be the very vice-minister of the IJN when that tragic Panay Incident occurred, the while the President Roosevelt was serving his second term of the US presidency.

If one gets clued in on these biographical data, it becomes not so difficult for anyone to imagine why both of these proud naval persons had taken the very collision course for them as the inevitable challenge; hence forth, the situation went on fast accelerated or escalated into the so-called "Chicken Game" phase from which neither Roosevelt nor Yamamoto could easily have gotten out.

(To be Continued)