

From Copenhagen to Coventry—A hypothetical attempt at solving the so-called Pearl Harbor riddles (II)

By

Jiro ANZAI

A possible conceptual key that would open the door for the Riddle House of the so-called Yalta Treaty

One final key, or to be more exact, one conceptual key which might or would unlock the tightest security door of the PHA Riddle House is the existence of the so-called Yalta Treaty signed between Premier Stalin and President Roosevelt. It should be recalled that the existence of such the monstrous treaty as the Yalta had never been disclosed by either party until exposed by the New York Times' competent reporter James Reston, some ten years after the secret signing of the said Treaty between Premier Stalin of USSR and President Roosevelt.

The contents analysis of this strange document has never ceased to amaze and astound peoples all over the world; for this gigantic inter-national treaty making, neither Vice President Truman nor the very Secretary of State Stettinius had been conferred: upon the matter in which the vital interests of not only the enemy people but those of the allied countries had been interwoven. The oddest and most unforgivable is the fact that neither the interests of the people of the Nationalist China nor of the Red China had been consulted; yes, indeed, minus any respective delegate or representative, and in the utmost secrecy, the issue had been decided by Messrs Stalin and Roosevelt, alone together. In still another word, the treaty-making that has come to so greatly affect the destiny of China and the fate of her people had been dealt, totally disregarding Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung. The resulting blunders and errors by Roosevelt had been exploited by Stalin and his associates to such the extent and extreme for their use that soon after the Yalta, the trapped man or Roosevelt had come to die of the bewildering shocks of having been thoroughly beaten by Stalin's grand strategy, and tactical maneuverings as well.

Although what has been disclosed of the Yalta Treaty by Reston alone is suffice to evoke a certain amount of doubt and suspicion as to the Rooseveltian conduct, it may not be so far from its truth that he had genuinely come to ask for the

Russian assistance, so as to save the lives of million American soldiers in the deadly contest as yet to come on invading the homeland of Japan. Even so, the question of why so much hush-hush or such the intense security cloaking had been placed over the entire issue, and that had been kept so long after the cessation of the World War II, remains to be clarified. Moreover, when we come to think it twice, we would soon realize the fact that, inasmuch as it involves military-diplomatic as well as ethno-politico commitments, such the treaty making could not possibly have been made, without having cohorts of military leaders and diplomatic aides. That feeble excuse put forth by certain quarters to the effect that the then President Roosevelt had neither consulted nor been conferred with his Vice President and his Secretary of State Stettinius, is not just illogical but an untenable one. For in the country like the democratic America where President is not, and should not be acting a totalitarian despot like Stalin, it just could not have been done.

Why then did the uncannily shrewd Roosevelt with full awareness of his country's economic as well as military supremacy, and on the height of his glories, with all those lend-lease assistances to Russia, have succumbed to Stalin's audacity and desires that had been culminatingly expressed in the said Treaty? The question becomes almost an eternal apolia when one recalls that it had been on the eve of the first atomic bomb test in New Mexico that Roosevelt had capitulated to Stalin, as though the latter had been the victor, and the former the vanquished. In reference to this, it should be recalled that only through the Rooseveltian lend-lease aids extended so liberously to Soviet, Stalin and his military leaders had been able-bodied to pull through. Moreover, though the writer of this article is not hesitant to acknowledge the staunch resistances shown by the people of Russia, and the spearheading counter attacks made by T 34 Tanks (even these celebrated tank busters had been developed around the prototype machines invented by American inventor Walter Christie), without American aids, and certainly without the PHA, Leningrad and Moscow would have fallen into the German hands.

For all these just mentioned, the fact stands in that the very Premier Stalin of the USSR had dragged the otherwise victorious world leader Roosevelt all the way down to Yalta, and made him kowtow like a captured prisoner, having forced him to sign such the humiliating treaty that the hapless Roosevelt dared not to leak its existence to the American people, let alone to other nationals.

Under such the circumstances, the only probable or possible explanation, which the writer of this article infers, is the fiasco at the PHA; it might have been a colossal case of Stalinian blackmailing oriented to the then ailing Roosevelt (no doubt the Russian secret services did supply that vital information about Roosevelt's ill health to Stalin, at the most opportune time). To put it into far more concrete term, by saying he would betray Roosevelt's one-man act on the PHA, Stalin might have

forced the flabbergasted sickly man to sign that unthinkable Treaty.

The facts that neither Washington nor Moscow had wanted anything to do with Dr. Sorge, and in case of Russia, even during the war when lights were already gleaming on the Allies' victory, and even after the command of the world situations had been so securely obtained by both American and Russian armed forces, they had bent every effort to deny any connection whatsoever of the Sorge Spy Ring activities. Moreover, the very fact of the vehement denials by Washington of the Sorge implications, when the PHA issue with reference to the said Sorge's pre-Pearl activities in Tokyo, had been brought to the public focus, by General Willoughby, Head of General MacArthur's G-2, and duly reported by correspondents like John O'Donnell and others, seemed to have been telltaling of the existence of the complicated implications behind the issue.

Washington's undue stressings that Japan would wage war on Russia, another misleading signal that had been fed to Admiral Kimmel, CINCPAC

Another curious signal whose existence made clear now is the pre-Pearl Washington's, especially Admiral Stark's constant referencces to Admiral Kimmel of the possible war between Russia and Japan. This odd fact has been noted by Mrs. Roberta Wohlstetter, whose reserach work entitled *Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision*, seems to have a sanitizing value on the Rooseveltian conspiracy hypothesis concerning the PHA. This means, consequently, even the anti-revisionistic Wohlstetter, has been noting of the misleading orientation by Washington, especially of the then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark, to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii, as to the nature of the impending war.

To quote one example from the just-mentioned sources;

In the main Stark supported the hypothesis of an eventual attack on the Maritime Provinces after consolidation of their position in Southeast Asia, and he cautioned that everything possible be done to maintain the status quo in the Pacific without taking "provocative" measures. The advice in the letters, however, cannot be put in the balance with the CNO dispatches. As signals, the dispatches carried much more weight. The dispatch of October 16, estimating the cabinet change as "grave" and an attack by Japan on the United States and Britain as a "possibility," represented a consensus and was not meant to be superseded or canceled by the statement in the letter received by Kimmel on October 23, "Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us...." The October 16 dispatch, however, may have been weakened by emphasis on the "stronger possibility" of a Japanese attack on Russia, or by the directive to take

preparatory deployments. For these preparatory deployments directed Kimmel to put his ships in a position to move against the Marshalls rather than to deploy them in the most satisfactory way to meet an attack.¹⁾

The oddity of the above phenomenon seems only explainable in the light of the presence of shrewd maneuverings by Stalin and his delegates upon the key decision makers in Washington. When the Anglo-American cryptographic services under the cloak of Ultra or Magic had been deciphering and decoding almost all the topmost German as well as Japanese secret codes, and in late 1941, Tokyo's placing a sort of grid on the Pearl Harbor had been known, even Mrs. Wohlstetter's defense-counsel looks to be rather lacking in convincing powers.

On the page 213 of her book, Wohlstetter states that all the Washington key figures, including Admiral Stark had failed to see "the bombing plot" in the now-seems-fatal Tokyo's September 24 directive (translated on October 9). Moreover, Nov. 15, 20, 29 messages, all of which seeking the extreme detail of ship dispositions in Pearl, are said to have been totally ignored.

Admiral Stark could not recall having seen the message. "I can only say," he testified, "that it went through our people, it went through the Army, who were likewise vitally interested in the defense of Pearl Harbor, and I do not recollect anyone having pointed out. There was literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the Japanese appetite was almost insatiable for detail in all respects. The dispatch might have been put down just as another example of their great attention to detail."

These interpretations were understandable at the time. These intercepts picked up between Tokyo and Honolulu formed only a small fraction of a large number of requests for similar information from other important ports in the United States and from the Philippines and the Panama Canal. If the September 24 message was actually a bomb plot, then certainly enough information was being forwarded to Tokyo for the Japanese to prepare attacks on Manila, the Canal, Seattle, San Diego, etc....²⁾

The above argument by Wohlstetter seems only plausible to laymen; for any personnel with tactical mind that could still fail to see the import and implications hidden in the message, look absurd. The bracketed insertion of (These are not so important) phrasing alone, should have given away the drafter's true intention. It has been observed that Tokyo had been urging Honolulu consulate to cut down on the volume of the secret message; knowing this, should have tightened the American analysts' guard when scanning the so-called "bomb plot" message. For clarification,

this part will be quoted as follows :

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important), tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible, we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)³⁾

The last sentence, even though led by "If," it could mean nothing but an unmistakable sign for Tokyo's determination to press the aerial bombing attack on these ships sandwiched between the pier and another ships moored just alongside them.

Stark's unbelievable amnesia betrays his evasive actions against and away the explicit charge of his having been an incompetent and negligent officer. Inasmuch as he could not have been such the dull officer, he should have recognized on the spot this bombing plot by the Japanese navy. If there can be still any room for strangeness or oddity, the oddest is the very fact that of all the persons concerned, the same Admiral Stark who had long kept reminding the two generations of the CINCPAC (Admirals Richardson and Kimmel) of the dangers of aerial surprise attacks, ever since the Royal Navy's raids at Taranto, Italy, on November 11, 1940, had gone into a somnambulistic state during the most crucial period, in the later part of the next year, in which, so far as the Japanese activities concerned, every signal had been pointing to the mounting signs for the eventual clash between the IJN and the USN.

East Wind Rain Definitely Executed !

Here again exist wide gulfs of discrepancy ; here again, almost all the allied documents, having dwelt at length on it seem to be giving a negative view that such the execute had never been radioed, or at least never received in time. Even this is not true, as far as most Japanese documents tell. As far as Commander Yuzuru Sanematsu, naval attaché at Washington, is concerned, no sooner had it been executed than he had aptly destroyed his code books and cipher machines. The execute has been broadcast on the NHK short-wave radio. According to Commander Sanaematsu, late in the afternoon of December 4, Washington time, Petty Officer Haginomoto, radio operator, had heard clear and sure, on the NHK overseas service short wave, "East Wind, Rain" execute, and on the spot informed Commander Sanematsu, who in turn heard it, and promptly commenced his code and paper destructions.

Ever since the cessation of the US occupation of Japan, this fact or the possible fact has been presented by Commander Sanematsu and other non-fiction writers, such

as Joe Kojima and Hiroyuki Agawa (ex-navy cryptanalytical officer now turned a full-fledged novelist); of these, Agawa went so far as to say the Americans had also known its import.

The Americans had also deciphered the message "easterly wind rain," which NHK's short wave foreign station sent out repeatedly just before the opening of hostilities, and knew that it was a warning to all diplomatic agencies on American soil that they were to burn their code books on account of impending hostilities....⁴⁾

So far as we, the Japanese are concerned, all the documents are treating or describing the wind-message execute as *fait accompli*. In fact, the extent of trouble and toil many American people have taken to negate the wind-code execute, despite the presence of the on-the-spot cognizance by Commander Krammer, Captain Sadtler and others, of the said execute on the same December 4 Day, now makes us feel and wonder if there had indeed been a cloud of guilt complex on the part of Americans concerned on the very issue.

What has been the most decisive is the mention by Captain Sadtler to the effect that upon hearing the wind-code execute, the said officer had tried to send the very information to the Hawaiian Commander that Japan was about to wage war on US, that every measure be taken so as to discourage the surprise attack attempt as done by the Japanese at Port Arthur! How greatly upset this officer had had been, when his opportune request had been turned down by his senior officers, the accounts of which had been indignantly reported by Messrs Sanborne and Morgenstern, Dr. Beard and Admiral Theobald.

The above-mentioned almost-saboteur-like behaviors shown by the Washington high officials, could be reconciled only in view of the recent developments on the Anglo-American journalism, especially by such the reveals or exposes as Winterbotham's⁵⁾ *Ultra Secret* or William Stevenson's⁶⁾ *A Man Called Intrepid*.

The Blames upon the Japanese for resulting in the Surprise Attack should have been placed upon the Japanese Embassy in Washington

One of the most curious facts concerning the charges by the Allied against the Government of Japan on the possible conspiratory attack on Pearl Harbor is, the complete omission or exemption of the ambassadorial staff at Washington from any such charges; in fact, neither Ambassador Nomura of Japan at the Japanese Embassy in Washington nor his special aide Ambassador Kurusu had been brought to the Tokyo International Tribunal Court; another astonishing thing is the fact that of the

above-mentioned ambassadorial level, neither Nomura nor Kurusu, not even a single secretary has been apprehended or detained in the Sugamo Prison which kept the war-criminal suspects. This seems extremely odd, when in truth, the failure of delivering the 14-part message, the ultimatum, by the official representatives of the Imperial Japanese Government, had not been resulted from the deliberate politico-military conspiracy in Tokyo, but that it had been brought out due to the unimaginable negligence and poor cognizance of the grave situations on the part of the embassy staff.

As we recall now Tokyo had been forewarning them that the grave situation was to come, almost automatically since after November 27; moreover, they had ordered the destruction of all codebooks, cipher machines and papers, except one set of code for decoding the ultimatum; essentially, the same sort of directives had been to the legations and embassies all over the world. Under these circumstances only the most irresponsible fool-hardies should have been loafing; but as the facts stood, instead of having prepared the translation of the 13-part received on the day before, almost all the secretarial people, including the code officer on night duty (According to George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor, A Story of Secret War*⁷⁾) had been attending the farewell party for First Secretary Hidenari Terasaki and several others that were supposed to leave for Mexico, within few days, as instructed by Tokyo.

The fact that this Terasaki and several others had been none other than secret arms of the Japanese Government's intelligence set-up in both the North and South American Continents had been well known by the American authorities, the fact of which not only appears in such the earlier accounts of Pearl Harbor studies as Rear Admiral Theobald's or George Morgentern's, is still carried in Mrs. Wohlstetter's book, the book endorsed by a New York Times book reviewer as the definitive edition on the PHA.

The fact that on the exchanges of the ambassadorial staffs between Japan and US, the US authorities had permitted everyone of them to leave for Japan, is not only a diplomatic gesture of immunity but also a reflection of the utmost endeavors to prevent Japan from learning or suspecting that her secret codes had been read by the US authorities. This at the time should have been indeed very sane and practical procedure, and even Governor Dewey would have been concurred, as he did indeed during the war.

But once the war was over, no such the precaution would have been necessary; Instead, to charge Japan and her Tokyo Government on account of the so-called conspiratory attack on Pearl, apprehending of the Japanese Ambassadors and all staff seems the only natural step; alas, such the roundup had never been done. Moreover, if the confessional account by Kantaro Shimoda, third steward on board M. S. *Awamaru*⁸⁾ had been true, both the ambassadors, or Ambassador Nomura and his

special aide Kurusu, had been treated as *persona grata*, together with Mr. Shimoda (Awamaru's bartender), each given a luxurious suite at Marunouchi Hotel. Who is this man called Shimoda? In short, he is the sole survivor of the Green Crossed Ship accidentally sank by a US submarine on April 1, 1945, off Formosa. This means that during the height of war-criminal suspects's hunting by the Allied nations, neither Nomura nor Kurusu had been arrested, instead they had been, together with the said Awamaru-survivor, screened from against the public attention.

It can be said of these two ambassadors that the US Government had been well aware through the decoded Purple messages their genuine good faith and sincere desires to come to the peaceful negotiations; be that as it may, as the very delegate of the Tokyo Government, especially of the Foreign Office, it was their utmost responsibility and duty to deliver the 14-part Tokyo ultimatum to the US Government at 1:00 PM in Washington time on that fateful December 7 day. Alas, they had miserably failed on this, due to their own negligence, however and whatever their personal good will towards America had been. And thus, here again what seems to be an eternal apolia exists.

Can this juxtapositioning of Third Steward Shimoda of M. S. *Awamaru* (a Nippon-Yusen's cargo/passenger ship), with the two of the high officials, the very Japanese Ambassadors on that ill-fated peace mission, be another key that would lead to the inner door to the Riddle-laden Mystery Mansion of the World War II?

It should be recalled that the time was ripe for the allied revenge or vendetta; in fact, in the categories such as the B- and C-class War Criminal suspects, revenging spirits ran high and sometimes wild, and yet those ambassadors had been treated rather nicely, together with Shimoda, as though they all had been a sort of collective family skelton for America!

Of the two ambassadors from Tokyo most of us have been in the know, but who is this mystery man Shimoda, and what did the *Awamaru* do, by way of espionage? You might ask. The answer is Kantaro Shimoda is a bartender *per se* on board M. S. *Awamaru*, and the man himself had nothing to do with secret activities; the ship in question, on her return voyage to Japan from the South-Eastern Asia (having delivered Red-Cross relief packages for the allied prisoners of war then still locked up in various prisoners-of-war camps in the Japanese-occupied areas), was running the allied blockade, under the cloak of Green-crossed Ship. As part of the writer's efforts to be fair and sure in description, he should point out the fact that on both ways the *Awamaru* had violated the safety-conduct rules; and put such strategic materials as amunitions, bombs and aircraft engines and parts into cargo holds on her way to, and placed thousands of crated gold, diamond, bauxite, tin and rubber on her return leg, with thousands of civilians, military officers and high officials. It seemed that everyone had thought her the safest means for the Japanese to escape; alas, the

illegal facts had been duly detected by the allied intelligence services, and the ship had come to be sunk by a US sub, with only one survivor or the fore-mentioned K. Shimoda rescued.

The strange part of it is, despite the fact that the said *Awamaru* had been violating the safety conduct rules or conditions (her safe voyages had been guaranteed only under the express condition that she be doing her red-cross relief parcel delivery services alone), both the US Navy and the American Government had been unduly reticent over the Japanese violations; in fact, as Shimoda says, they had treated him as almost a *persona grata*. The American reticency and non-condescending attitude had been such that the survived Japanese families tried to obtain the compensations; it was only afterwards that the occupational authorities stiffened and told them they had no real right to sue for such the compensations inasmuch as the *Awamaru* and the Japanese Government had been deliberately violating the safety conduct rules.

Be that as it may, as a research scholar that has been hunting for truth he would like to posit a question; that is, what then had been the common denominator that should have justified the persona-grata-like housing of Nomura-Kurusu-Shimoda trio?

The real reason that should have been lying behind the scene could have been the safeguarding of the now-much-celebrated Ultra Secret activities, and that the very conducts of the M.S. *Awamaru* in violation of the safety conduct had been pinpointed through the Ultra activities, are one of the most plausible guesses, as far as the writer of this article is concerned. In the light of the Ultra Secret Activities, the reason why the Allied Nations, especially Anglo-American authorities had wished to wash their hands off the *Awamaru* case, with the seemingly least amount of fuss and attention-gathering ordeals of civil trials.

The American reluctance even after the cessation of the World War II, of disclosing the *Awamaru* case's detail, would suddenly become an understandable matter, on the pretext that the very message that doomed her to destruction had been detected not just by the coast guard observations or friendly natives' tip-offs, but through the direct deciphering of the Japanese Navy's ultra-super codes that forecast not only her itinerary but all about her secret missions. Now that some thirty six years have elapsed, there no longer seems to be lying any reason to keep the public and those interested over the matter in total abyss. Indeed, in this cosmic age or outer-space huntings, when cryptographic techniques have been so advanced, there can be no reason to keep the dark lids over the matter, the outsiders often reason. But those *in the know* seem not to be inclined in the same vein of thought. Thus, all we could do is to go on a very primitive, circumlocutory way. And, to pick up the starting thread, the writer of this article would like to return to Admiral Yamamoto. For the benefit of the English reading people, the writer would like to call their attention to John Bester's translated version of *Admiral Yamamoto* which

entitled *The Reluctant Admiral*. The passages I would like to use for my starting thread are as follows;

The question resolves itself into one of whether America genuinely did not know that Japan intended to attack Pearl Harbor. Even today, no really clear-cut answer is forthcoming. The findings of the Pearl Harbor inquiry commission, which met on a number of occasions during the war, and of the postwar joint investigating committee of both Houses of Congress are that, through neglect of their duties, Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Kimmel, General Short, army commanding officer in the Hawaii area, and Chief of Naval Operations Stark bore responsibilities for Pearl Harbor. However, this verdict has encountered many objections, and still seems to be a source of controversy, even within America itself.

One thing that seems certain, however, is that even if it knew of the impending attack in advance, America did not expect to suffer such devastating losses; the reason was its gross underestimation of Japanese air power....⁹⁾

Even though I have no objection but praises for John Bester's prosaic rendering into English the well-reputed Agawa original, when it comes to the very crucial matter of cryptographic activities pertaining to the PHA, Midway and Admiral Yamamoto's death, Bester's apparent omissions of the detailed discussions on the original text, are not only the most regrettable but wanting.

For example, preceding the foregoing quote translated by John Bester, Agawa has the following phrases in his original, the import and implications of which can hardly be missed by anyone concerned; they are as follows;

Pertaining to deciphering other nations' secret codes, America not only has a long history from her Black Chamber days, but fairly good records; be that as it may, Japan too had progressed at least from her childish Washington-Conference-day level; they had been using complex random number tables plus code machines. Even then fearing much of the Foreign Office's secret telegrams' being read, and to meet the emergency situation due to the strained relations between Japan and US, the Type 97 Typewriters or the navy-developed new secret code machines had been lent out to major embassies and the Foreign Office. The machine is far exceeding in performance as compared to former machine or the IJN's *Ro* or *Ha* codes, its code was termed J, its machine named the Type 97 Typewriter; it furthermore is subdivided into two categories; the Navy used Type 97 Hobun-injiki or Type 97 Japanese-letter Typewriter (Kana-sentence) and the Foreign Office, the Type 97 Obuninjiki or European alphabet... In America

the deciphered messages are called Purple messages... It so happens that the very cover coloring of the original Japanese secret codebook is also Purple. Had its cracking been purely executed through inference and mathematical calculations, the statement that they did not see the original at all, would have to be admitted credible; but the fact remains that the Americans had been calling it Purple. Could it have been a real coincidence?... To distribute the basic codebooks and machines to various overseas posts, the only means possible had been the use of couriers with their right of diplomatic immunity, nevertheless, during prolonged voyage in those days, who knows there had been some visilent eyes with tampering. Moreover, the machine's blue print might have been copied in Tokyo, and smuggled out to Shanghai, and its eventually finding its way into America, no one could deny the plausibility of such the hypothesis¹⁰⁾....

The original Agawa text goes far more into the detailed discussions of cryptography, and ends with the following; "Besides this, one of the great enigmas pertaining to the above is; why did America fail in reading the IJN codes the while it had been succeeding in deciphering the Foreign Office's Type 97 European Typewriter-spewed secret telegrams?"

To add the needless clarification, what Agawa meant here is; how could the American Navy have failed to decipher the IJN codes before the PHA, the while the American Naval and Military Cryptoanalytic Offices had been deciphering the Type 97 European Typewriter telegrams, quite as freely as almost as if they were of their own codes? Inasmuch as essentially the same machines and same grand principles had been used in both machines, they could not possibly have failed. (To be continued)

References

- 1) Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 50.
- 2) *Ibid.*, p. 213.
- 3) *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- 4) Hiroyuki Agawa, *The Reluctant Admiral* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979)
- 5) Winterbotham, *Ultra Secret* (New York: Dell Publising, 1974)
- 6) William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (London: Sphere Books, 1976)
- 7) George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor, A Story of Secret War* (New York: Adair, 1947)
- 8) Masatake Chihaya, *Noro-wareta* (ill-fated) *Awamaru* (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1969)
- 9) H. Agawa, *op. cit.*, pp. 281—282.
- 10) H. Agawa, *Isoroku Yamamoto* (Tokyo: Shinchyosha, 1969), pp. 289—293.