

From Copenhagen to Coventry—a hypothetical attempt at solving the so-called Pearl Harbor riddles (I)

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Nowadays, simply speaking in terms of its spatio-temporal proximity, the distance from Copenhagen to Coventry is few hours' hop in jet-set terms; but when considered in the historical sense, import and implications that could be deduced from the same flight, are far more considerable. And when the writer of this article is speaking of the latter, he is considering both Coventry and Copenhagen as historic arrays of events, or strategic events that had taken place, as the so-called *Copenhagening* in 1801, and the so-called *Coventrating* in 1940, respectively.

The readers, familiar either with military history or the semantic word implications should have been well aware from the very beginning that these seemingly innocent place names are but carrying the very decisive meanings, or the holistic devastations or complete uprooting of the enemy's bastion of defenses from the face of the earth or the surface of the sea, and the smashing of the retaliating powers within it.

When considering in much more strict frame of references, the 1801 Copenhagen was the Nelsonic one and a naval surprise attack at that directed against and born upon the Denmark's naval bastion and men-of-war therein in a twinkling moment, and the subsequent awareness of the fact that the defenders' fighting powers had been decisively knocked out, even before the victims had been half realized of their being attacked. In a word, by this act alone that Admiral Nelson had written a finger-on-the-wall for the successive generations not only of naval persons all over the world but also peoples deeply meditating on the issues raised by the British admiral. And the facts that the said Nelsonian Copenhagening has been entertained among the naval persons, as forerunner of the naval surprise attacks that would lead up to Port Arthur and to the Pearl Harbor, and still later that Coventrating as the carrying out of the Italian air strategist Duhet's massive air attack theory enacted on the hapless city, by the German *Luftwaffe*, are in fact no news; yes, indeed, the world histories have been, not without the preceding cases of the so-called surprise attacks, from the Biblical David's to the Hitlerian *Blitzkrieg*, so far as the semantics is concerned, usually the single word or one place name has been enough to tell the story.

In the twentieth century, it should be recalled that until the notorious attack delivered

by the Imperial Japanese Navy from the air upon Pearl Harbor and the subsequent Hiroshima by the US Air Force, the names like *Coventry* and *Guernica* had been the word that passed for the complete uprooting of the target city full of people in mufti. But when we trace back to the theoretical origins of the massive aerial attacks and their potential powers the names that should be coming up are the Italian Duhet's or of the American Billy Mitchell's, and certainly not of the British air-minded's philosophy behind the RAF's Bomber Command; we should bear our historical as well as intellectual bombsight upon the course of the Coventry disaster and its implications, being steered by and in the light of recently uncovered Churchillian anecdotes, as revealed by William Stevenson in his book entitled *A Man Called Intrepid*.¹⁾

Had these reveals or exposé by Stevenson, and Frederick Winterbotham, the author of *The Ultra Secret*,²⁾ been true, the implications of the Coventry lessons should have been far greater than anyone thus far imagined; yes, indeed, had these descriptions in the above-mentioned source of the Churchillian Government been absolutely true, the meanings of Coventrating should be re-examined. Even if we take up a fairly modest view upon the event, the knowledge of that doomed city had long been in Mr. Churchill's hand, and the ironic as well as tragic fact is that people in Coventry had been not only taken by complete surprise from the air by the Germans, but doubly surprised by the Churchillian decisions; for the safe keeping of the British *Ultra Secret* obtained directly from the German military's supposedly secret communications, especially for the safe guarding of the British intelligence service's utmost service to Churchill and his military leaders, both Churchill and his cabinet members, had deliberately withheld the very information so that the doomed city was indeed left sitting under a Damoclean sword, to the oncoming *Luftwaffe* attacks.³⁾ Although the extent of angers and frustrations the people there have felt is understandable, the very implications that this episode would have contained, seem to be far reaching, when subjected to much more global and strategic war designing points.

For it could be inferred from the fore-mentioned that the Churchillian decisions had not only influenced the relations between the Germans and the British, but all other nations involved in WW II. In a word, the writer of this article is proposing a view, hitherto unimagined by anyone, upon the course of the so-called Pearl Harbor Attack (hereafter abbreviated as the PHA) and its riddles, in that the very PHA (the while the event itself was unexcusably the Imperial Japanese Navy's doings or undoings), had resulted in a complete tactical surprise mainly due to the overbearing as well as overpowering "hindsight" of the one man or the late President Roosevelt of the USA that had been the total prey to the spells of the Churchillian leadership, having drawn a great deal of its strength from the Ultra Secret kingdom of cryptographic knowledges; moreover, the Rooseveltian debacle at the PHA seems to have stemmed from the facts that he had, more often than not, been a pawn to the devilish maneuverings by Stalin,

also strongly reinforced by ways of the military intelligence of ultra secret nature, of which the writer is to deal in the latter part.

In order to fully explicate the above-mentioned line of reasonings, the writer should like to take up the readers on the course of historic events that could be summed up in a phrase entitled *From Tsushima to Taranto*.

From Tsushima to Taranto

From the Tsushima in 1905, or to be more exact, from the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, the great sea contest that had been fought between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Russian Expeditionary Force or the Baltic Fleet, led by Admirals Togo (of Japan) and Rozhdestvenski (of Russia), respectively, to the aerial surprise attack in 1940 against the Italian Fleet nestling in Taranto Harbor, the passage of thirty years had elapsed. And yet, here again, the contemporary distance, geo-physically speaking, is a whiff of breath for jet-set agers; nevertheless, for the strategic as well as tactics minded, from the establishment of the Capping T tactics⁴⁾ by Togo to the sinkings of the ultra super dreadnaughts *Musashi* and *Yamato* by the American aerial attacks, is not a flight to be dismissed quite so easily as in the former. Even if the end of the Capping T had been unconsciously executed by the descendants of Togo's Navy or the Nagumo's at the PHA, one cannot help remembering the preceding lessons given to the world over by the Royal Navy's Carrier Task Force against the Italian surface fleet at Taranto.

The Equivocal Receptions by Roosevelt's military leaders of the Taranto lessons, a blindspot in the PHA studies

Although hundreds of thousands of words have been spoken in defense of the late President Roosevelt and his cabinet leaders and military associates in Washington for their innocence, the facts remain in that very drama at Taranto, Italy, on November 11, 1940, by the Churchill's naval air arms against *Italian* Pearl, had been open to all, and free for all to draw conclusions. If many Anglo-American writers and researchers could talk of the event for so much as to have given the model and lessons⁵⁾ for Admiral Yamamoto and his Imperial Japanese Navy (hereafter abbreviated as the IJN) to copy and repeat, the same show and lessons should have been far more to America and the USN, their very data far more accessible to the British moral allies such as Roosevelt and his military leaders. In fact, as the records testify, no sooner had the news of the British success at Taranto reached the world than the US Navy's top echelons had taken a few decisive actions or reactions; to name just one example, Admiral Stark, the Chief of the Naval Operations, had sent special directives or cables, instructing Admiral Richardson (Kimmel's predecessor C-in-C of the Pacific Fleet) to tighten on the Pearl Harbor security and study the defense problems from every feasible angle. Indeed,

from the Taranto attack by the British onwards, all the directives or coded messages that had poured in on from Washington to Hawaii had been minding and re-minding of the dangers of the possible air attacks on Pearl, and the same trend intensified after Richardson had been replaced by the ill-fated Admiral Kimmel as the successor C-in-C of the Pacific Fleet (now permanently based in Hawaii by the Presidential order).

One of the most interesting things in the pre-PHA data concerning the conducts of the USN's leaders in Washington, especially of Admiral Stark's, is the very enigmatic *Janus*-like double barrelled reactions he had shown on the receptions of the Taranto lessons; for no less than few days after the event, Admiral Stark in person had sent urgent warnings to the then C-in-C of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Richardson of the dangers of the situations there. For all these, however, on the 27th of January, 1941, or no more than two months afterwards, when Ambassador Grew from Tokyo had sent in the news of the PHA design brewing, the same Stark had replied to the American Ambassador of extreme foresight and intelligence, his Department of the USN did not believe in its validity, as follows:

The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore based on known data regarding the present disposition and deployment of Japanese naval and army forces no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for the foreseeable future.⁶⁾

This attitude of Stark on the matter, however, does not automatically write him off as a man of no foresight; in fact, as the foregoing statements show, not only Admiral Stark but also the Naval Intelligence people had been acting like that Roman God Janus, with bicephalous brains and mouthpieces, feeding the American diplomatic people in Tokyo a concocted information as though Washington were not in the least aware of the possible surprise attack being cooked up by the IJN; for the diplomatic gray code by which this reply would have been carried back to Tokyo was of a questionable security, the security of the said code had been questioned by the authorities concerned for quite a sometime, as revealed incidentally on the occasion of sending of the illfated Presidential Appeal for Peace to the Emperor just before the PHA; "Shoot this to Grew. I think it can go in gray code—save time—I don't mind if it gets picked up," said F.D.R.

This means that President Roosevelt and his intelligence service knew for long that the American diplomatic code termed *gray* had been cracked and read by the Japanese, which happened to be more than true. Thus, strange and enigmatic double-barrelled attitudes and actions shown by Stark and US Naval Intelligence betray that they in turn had been in a sort of deceptive actions. This hypothesis would be backed up when we are to examine the followings.

In Defense of the Ultra Secret

There has been a theory expounded by such people as Professors Charles Beard⁹⁾ and Charles Tansill,¹⁰⁾ Lawyer Sanborn,¹¹⁾ and Rear Admiral Theobald¹²⁾ of the USN that had been arguing the blames and blunders at the Pearl Harbor Infamy should be squarely placed upon the late President Roosevelt and his associates that had truly precipitated or caused the so-called Pearl Harbor disaster, popularly termed as the revisionists' view. Though the furies and ireful bursts those Americans have felt are understandable, in my opinions they are carrying their reasonings, too far, and the revisionists' claims' greatest weakness seems to have been lying in their non-refutability for the argument that the man of Roosevelt's status and quality could not, and should not, have sacrificed the entire Pacific Fleet to the oncoming Japanese attack.

The recent reveals by William Stevenson¹³⁾ and F.W. Winterbotham,¹⁴⁾ both of the British Secret Service's, seem to be, to the writer of this article, betraying a grain of truth or a finger of the dawning lights that would anticipate the full reveals of the so-called PHA riddles.

What the writer of this research paper means is; that the Rooseveltian ultra handling of the magic truths obtained from the broken Japanese codes and ciphers should have been the direct influences of the Churchillian decisions on the ill-fated Coventry; and that the Pearl Harbor Attack and its disastrous results had been brought upon the unsuspecting Pacific Fleet, not because the late President Roosevelt and his associates had conspired as claimed by the revisionists or isolationists, but because President Roosevelt and his military associates (taking full cognizances of the Taranto lessons) had ultra secretly prepared dramatic counter attacks, in a fashion of the late Admiral Togo's Capping T (not exactly a duplicate of the then obsolete Togo's T by the surface fleet alone, but in the full uses of such modern developments as submarines, heavy land-based bombers, and carrier-based planes, in tridimensional counter attacks against the unsuspecting Nagumo Force).

Had we taken the just-mentioned view, the facts that President Roosevelt and his cabinet members, especially top military leaders' hitherto unbelievable behaviors on the eve of the PHA, their very conducts of affairs to the point of verging on subversive actions or their bewitched-like endeavors (not to let the Hawaiian defense authorities know of the Damoclean sword-like dangers, of which the broken Japanese codes had been amply betraying) had not been of their devilish will to sacrifice the Fleet and Hawaiian defenses, but of the utmost cares and vigilance to keep the Japanese off the *Ultra Secret* or *Magic*, to that extent, having drawn the especial lesson from the Churchillian conduct on Coventry and other occasions.

For all this, had the above assumption been the nub of the matter, the very efforts of the Churchill-inspired Roosevelt and his government leaders had in the end come to

contribute in defeating their own endeavors and cause. This of course, is concluding the argument too prematurely. We certainly should probe the matter further, by thorough reviewing of various and sundry circumstantial evidences pertaining to the pre-PHA incidents.

A positive view on the Rooseveltian Hysterises

Hitherto all those Rooseveltian anecdotes and the psychological or psychic hysterises that had been used for the revisionists' claim seem to have been failing in explaining the reasons why that navy-loving Roosevelt should have sacrificed the precious Pacific Fleet, without having any daring counter coup. Indeed, the revisionists' claim that Roosevelt and his factions had deliberately sacrificed the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii so as to drag the reluctant Americans into the war and to save Britain by means of the back-door, is not only untenable but also out of keeping with the Roosevelt' celebrated psychic nature and hysterises or the prior data of his mental history and past experiences. By the above, the writer of this article means the existence of warm heartedness in Roosevelt for not only his people but others, as amply revealed in New Deal and lend-lease aids, and the combative spirits of his as betraying in his fights against infantile paralysis, etc.

What then had caused the Rooseveltian debacle that had precipitated in the end as the PHA fiasco? To these riddles that look at first sight seemingly an eternal apolia, the writer of this article would like to employ the same large heartedness on the part of Roosevelt as the very key concept, *i.e.*, as the utmost master key that would unlock the door, and his indefatigable aggressiveness in almost anything he had been put to. The largeness of heart in him had been mainly directed towards the hard-pressed Britishers and Russians, then in deadly contest with the Hitlerian Germany. The so-called lend-lease assistances that had been extended not only to Britain but also to Russia, and ample good wills offered—to all manners of people in all walks of life—are enough to testify this mental state in him, until this had been rewarded with the spine-chilling receptions and iron will of Stalin at Yalta.

In order to elaborate the above-mentioned statements, the writer of this article would like to call the readers' attentions to a series of anecdotes and what seems to be trite bits of informations on the surface level; not just to their existence but to their depths to which not one writer and scholar has paid any attention, and argue that thread ends which might lead to the hidden truths seem to be lying in those scrappy materials that are, unless otherwise, doomed to be thrown into the wastebasket of history.

In the writer's opinion, these are but the now-seen and now-hidden tops of the fog-shrouded icebergs whose ominous bottoms have as yet been submerged, not just in the depths of the so-called PHA riddles, but also in the deeps of people's psyche, only waiting for the historical research divers of psychological bent to examine and expose.

The depths of the matter (which more often than not happened to be true) are fre-

quently seen betraying in what appears to be a meaningless behavior or a slip of tongue; the above statement, one of the cardinal claims by the Depths Psychology, seems to be consonant with the so-called PHA riddles. Yes, indeed, Lieutenant Commander Doir¹⁵⁾ Johnson of the USN on board the battleship *West Virginia*, when confronted with the ghastly sight of the ship's porthole glass melting away due to the intense heat generated by the Japanese bombing had on the spot thought of Salvador Dali's limp watch picture (which incidentally happened to be entitled as "Persistence of Memory") and a sailor on the battleship *California*¹⁶⁾ had mistaken a Japanese carrier plane for a *Russian carrier plane* (sic!) *paying a sort of courtesy visit*.

The op-art-like effect generated by the dissolving porthole glass was of course quite a chance happening, although symbolism one now gets out of this anticipatory or prophetic happening can be inferred on this day of *goatability*. But the latter's import and implications can hardly be ignored. For in the first place, at the time Russians had had no carrier to speak of, and that fact being part and parcel of anyone's sailor's knowledge, such the perception could not have occurred so easily. Moreover, however deeply astounded the said sailor had been, for a seasoned seaman aboard the Pacific Fleet's proud battleship *California* to have mistaken a Japanese plane's *meat ball* (rising sun insignia) for a Russian red star—is an unthinkable phenomenon, something that just does not add up; the thought like that could not have happened so easily, unless prior to the incident, on to the memory registering area of the sailor's brain, by means of his sense organs (especially ears and eyes) certain bits of information pertaining to Russia must have been *in-put*, and kept stored on what seemed to be rather a shallow level of his semi consciousness.

The just-mentioned is naturally a working hypothesis, and we now proceed to test this hypothesis, using historical events or happenings whose authenticity has been at least doubly or triply checked.

On December 5th (Hawaiian date) of 1941, the IJN's Nagumo Mobile Force (Carrier Task Force), whose mission it was to deliver the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, proceeding at the average speed of 20 knots, was met head-on by a ship of the third nation; the ship in question had been observed bearing that unmistakable hammer and sickle Russian insignia¹⁷⁾, proceeding at about 8 knots, unwaveringly on her base course. Thus, within few hours on that day of December 5, 1941, the Nagumo Striking Force had been closely observed by the Russian ship just mentioned. Luckily to the flabbergasted Admiral Nagumo and his staff, the Russian ship had dissolved her phantomly figure behind the foggy curtains of the North Pacific, without radioing even a single sighting report. "The Heavens came to our favor," reasoned the people aboard the Nagumo Force.

The above-mentioned anecdote, of a first-order thriller story, had been whispered as almost semi-open secret, among those who had had kins or intimates in the IJN, through-

out the war, until the defeat of the Imperial Japan and the subsequent defunction of the IJN. No sooner had the war ended than all the war historians and writers alike had kept their pens off this sensational topic, as though they had been far too sensitive to the Stalinian mood to worship *Clio*, or the Goddess of History.

The few exceptions to the above category of writers or researchers are novelists Hiroyuki Agawa (the author of *The Reluctant Admiral*) and Jo Toyoda (the author of Admiral Nagumo's semi-biographical account). Of these two novelists, the latter had spoken of the said ship as the Russian ship bearing the hammer and sickle Russian insignia on her smoke stacks.¹⁸⁾

The author Toyoda, himself a former navy dive bomber pilot officer, went so far as to say as follows; when reports of his force being sighted by a Russian ship came up to him on the bridge, Vice Admiral Nagumo's eyes were glued to the Nippon-kogaku's powerful binocular sights, his otherwise muscular and steady torso, began shaking like a leaf; moreover, after the Midway debacle and defeat he began describing of the pre-Pearl Harbor shock he had experienced on the very moment¹⁹⁾ was far surpassing the one he had felt at Midway, on losing his entire carrier force! The above statement is heartily endorsed by Nagumo's surviving wife and daughter, even today.

At the time, there existed between the USSR and the Imperial Japan non-aggression pact as well as neutrality observing treaty. Moreover, the very spot being part of the open high seas, Nagumo Force had no right to interfere with the Russian ship's course or actions she would have seen fit to take. The situation, nevertheless, was critical for Nagumo and his task force; now that they had been brought well within the striking action radius of land-based heavy bombers nestling on the Hawaiian fields, they could not possibly have escaped one-sided attacks from the high sky above; on the other hand, to bear the sledgehammer attacks by the carrier-based planes on Hawaii, the very Nagumo Force had as yet had to steam some thirty more hours to the point of their planes' take-off.

Nagumo's trembling lips parted, nevertheless, and the emotion-charged order that had ended with a question mark came out as follows;²⁰⁾ "Are our enemy's radio traffic listeners right on their job?" So the men on the job strained their head-phoned ears, listened and kept on listening far into the night, and to the next day, and again far into the night, but nothing ominous and dooming had been heard in the fog-charged ether of the Northern Pacific, and finally came the Zero Hour, on that fateful dawn of December 7th, 1941.

Is this anecdotal incident or episode merely a historical bit of dust that should have been swept off the backdoor of our consciousness? A speck of worthless dust that should be swept under the royal carpet of history? Or an important clue to the hidden truths about the Pearl Harbor Attack hitherto unnoticed and unchallenged?

My answer is consonant with the latter, and that involves, in a far more positive

fashion, many historical and historic incidents, and actions and personalities.

First of all, the writer of this article presents a hypothesis that would read this Russian ship as one of the observation vessels that would have been casting a search network on the northern sector of the high seas off Hawaii, whose concealed mission it was to search and sight the Nagumo Force that had been supposed to be coming down the Northern Pacific routes to Hawaii.

The above-mentioned doubt or suspicion concerning the Russian ship's possible intent, has been greatly strengthened when this researcher had come across in Paul Carell's *Unternehmen Barbarossa*²¹⁾ the mention of a Russian reconnaissance plane observing the Nagumo Task Force's Sortie out of the Hitokappu Bay (Tankan) on November 27, 1941. If this saying by Dr. Carell true, to consider that Kremlin might have been doubly checking the course and conduct of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force, as forewarned by the Russian spy master Sorge in Tokyo, may become a rewarding try.

With reference to the above-mentioned radio silence by the Russian ship, the writer of this article recalls of an episode disclosed by Max Klausen, the Sorge Spy ring's radio operator that had confessed as follows;²²⁾ one day Klausen had been asked by Sorge just to walk through the Tokyo Imperial Hotel's lobby where Sorge's right-hand man Otto was supposed to be sitting on a sofa, and that this mere walk-through without any verbal exchange, nor even raising eyebrows on either party, was to be automatically understood as the very sign that Sorge had been out of town, and in fact gone on to Shanghai.

The principle of the just-mentioned non-verbal communications between the two Soviet agents could not only be applicable to situations on much larger scales, but should have been one applied to the Kremlin-versus-the-Soviet-observation-vessels' communications, across the vast stretches of the Northern Pacific and Siberian Continent.

What is meant by the writer here is; the very radio silence by the Soviet ship had been taken, so far as Kremlin concerned, as the sure sign that she had sighted the predicted Japanese Task Force, whose sortie from the Hittokappu Bay had been already detected by the high-ceilinged Russian reconnaissance plane (as told by Carrel) some ten days ago.

But to President Roosevelt and his associates, Stalin would have utilized these Russian ships as a sort of double-edged sword, beating off the German attacks at Leningrad successfully, thanks to the reinforcements from the Siberian fronts, with full assurances that there should possibly be no immediate attacks from the eastern fronts as predicted by the Sorge report; and at the same time, having sent the Japanese mad dogs on their head-on rush to the deadly crash with the Americans at Pearl.

"A brilliant design, but with one flaw," some skeptics would say; why the Soviet and Stalin the existence of theirs had been dependent so much on the American strength should have wished such the devastations at Pearl? To this seemingly reasonable

question, the writer would say as follows; even the Sorge-clued-in Kremlin had underestimated the true capabilities of the Nagumo Force, as probably done by President Roosevelt and his military associates such as Admirals Stark and Halsey, until they had been really attacked by the Nagumo's; yes, indeed, when PHA had been successfully executed, the most surprised had been the very Japanese, and no other than the naval persons at that; even the original designer Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet, had been fearing that they would lose most of the carriers, due to the intense counter attacks from the Americans.

Misty presence in Hawaii of Russian Ambassador Litvinov, few days prior to the PHA

Another tip-off or clue which might have been *in-put* into the said American sailor's mind is the hitherto, unexplained and uncommented anecdote of Russian Ambassador Litvinov's uncanny presence on the island of Oahu, shortly before the PHA fiasco.

In order to effectively study this bit of news, the writer of this article would like to take the readers to the pre-Pearl Harbor conducts by the US armed forces in line of the Hawaiian Islands' Defense. Here again, somewhat curious and unaccountable state of affairs had been observed existing. Firstly, during the months of April and May in which the tensions between America and Japan had been showing no sign of letting-down or steam-off, but if any, ever mounting, the Northern Sector Patrol had been abolished.²⁴⁾

It should be recalled that the search network by patrol planes, covering 360 degrees, had been vigorously enforced; this intense search combing had started soon after Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo had tipped off Washington of the possible (though seemed fantastic at the time to Grew) surprise attacks on Hawaii by the IJN.

This means that the American defense forces had chopped off the very branch of the tree on which their fate had been perched, by their own deliberate undoings! But, why, and how, and by whom such the absurd order had been sanctioned? To posit even a reasonable answer, takes up the whole of this paper. And certainly patience and perseverance be needed.

Paying an especial attention, the novelist Agawa, himself ex-navy cryptographer, went so far as to say; had this been an American laid trap to lure the Nagumo? To the above-mentioned sudden abolishing of the northern sector patrols by the defenders (though this may come to an welcome parcel to the so-called revisionists' cause) we should not jump to a hasty conclusion so easily. Moreover, just how powerfully the omnipresent President Roosevelt had been exercising his Presidential rights of being the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, he could not possibly have gotten away, just by windholing the search network.

The revisionists' claim of Roosevelt's deliberately inviting sneak attacks seems to turn the very person of the late President Roosevelt into the status of a hypnotic victim, without the full faculty of one's will power, the images so contrary to the shrewd and aggressive Roosevelt.

A working hypothesis that goes consonant with the positive images of Roosevelt and yet still fits to the whole picture of the enigmatic zigsaw puzzling incidents and events pertaining to the PHA, especially on the matter of military intelligence gatherings. Though this may seem fantastic a proposition at first, when we ponder on the reasons why that shrewd, Churchill-worshipping Roosevelt and British-clued-in American Armed Forces, had fallen to that role of miserable sitting ducks, we begin to see some illuminating light for clarification.

Supposing the fore-mentioned hypothesis of the joint-venture agreement between Roosevelt and Stalin been true, the said Russian ship's deliberate failure in radioing the most desired news to Hawaii does wear more than an uncanny coloring. The Northern Sector off the Hawaiian Islands should have been covered by a network of Russian patrol vessels whose rights of navigation on that part of the high seas had been doubly guaranteed by the shields of both neutrality as well as non-aggression pact between Russia and Japan.

And, needless to say, the Southwestern approaches to the Hawaiian Islands had in actuality been well covered by at least three US Navy's powerful fast task groups, commanded by Admirals Halsey (on board the carrier *Enterprise*), Newton (aboard the carrier *Lexington*) and Brown (on a heavy cruiser), respectively.

The fact that these South-westerly Approaches to Hawaii had been the shortest possible distance from Japan, and thus thoroughly combed by the above-mentioned task groups, does not ensure Roosevelt's innocency, however; for, on the day and very hour of the Nagumo's launching the strike planes, at least Halsey's force had been well within the retaliating range; in fact, an advance group of his carrier planes had been mistaken for the Japanese ones, and some of them on reaching Oahu downed by their own anti-air guns²⁵⁾. This means; had the said Halsey Force been informed of the approximate locations of the Nagumo Force by the Russian tip-off, between 5th and the Day, what amounts to the American Victory at Midway some six months later, might have been feated, right at the very door of the Pacific War, off Pearl, perhaps, on the 6th of December, 1941, with crashing victories for the Americans!

When the fact that the Nagumo's Strike Force had crossed the international date line so long ago and now penetrated deep into the Northern Approaches to Hawaii, with his six first-line carriers screened by a number of fast battleships, heavy cruisers and destroyers, had been disclosed to the public and the world over, even the most diehard isolationists would have praised the Presidential foresight, sanctioning the act of retaliation prior to the 7th of December. Perhaps, the above line of reasoning had not

been far from the actual event, a probable missing link that would link Premier Stalin of the USSR with President Roosevelt of the USA, the tight bonds of theirs bringing the so-called Yalta Treaty at their ultimate. This is the heaven-sent golden opportunity to show to the world the American might, and to expose the evil intent of the Axis nations, especially of Admiral Yamamoto's, Stalin would have whispered, and Roosevelt might have been so moved and conquered by the idea.

With reference to the above assumption, the writer would like to add that Admiral Kimmel is not the ill-fated Pacifist; but he had been more than eager to fight, as betraying in the following reply of his to Admiral Stark, the then Chief of the Naval Operations at Washington.

In short, it is my earnest conviction that use of a carrier to deliver aircraft to Asiatic Russian ports in the present period of strained relations is to invite war. If we have decided upon war, it would be far better to take direct offensive action. If for reasons of expediency, it has been determined to force Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method that will be more advantageous to ourselves.²⁶⁾

Although the above plan to assist the Russians from the Pacific side cutting across the Japanese waters had come to be cancelled, it is telltaling of the possible grand strategy of joint venture nature between Stalin and the Roosevelt Administration.

At this point, nothing can be clear-cutly proven; but the fact stands in that the fore-mentioned Russian ship did nothing in ways of communications, but silently observing the Nagumo's speeding away towards Hawaii on her broadside, thus letting President Roosevelt and his Navy head-on fall to their infamy. As repeatedly mentioned, the above reasoning is a hypothesis, and yet as the readers themselves shall observe, the historical records in the past thirty years seem to have been loaded with circumstantial evidences that could support the above-mentioned. One of these so-called circumstantial evidences is the presence in Hawaii, on the eve of the PHA, of a man called Litvinov.

The said Presence, in Hawaii, of Russian Ambassador Litvinov, few days prior to the PHA, be reconsidered: in much more global lights

Perhaps as one of the circumstantial evidences that seem to be telltaling a certain kind of Russian contribution or conspiracy on the Pearl Harbor fiasco on December 7th, 1941, the very presence of Russian Ambassador Litvinov few days prior to the PHA could be mentioned. In as much as one versed in on the European Theatre of War recalls as to the military developments, the early December of the year 1941 had indeed been critical hours, the most decisive for both Germany and Russia that had been engaging in deadly struggles of contest ever since June 22nd of the same year 1941. In that early December period, the Russian homelands had been, needless to say, deeply

penetrated by the invading Germans, and in various and sundry tactical as well as strategic points, among which the contest between the Germans and Russians over the fate of Leningrad was of the foremost issue. Under such the circumstances, not only theoretically considered, but also from and by all lines of reasonings, the place to be occupied by Russian Ambassador to America Mr. Litvinov should have been right at Washington, D.C.; for only residing in that American capitol city, during those critical hours, he would have most efficiently and quickly asked Roosevelt for the precious assistances in munitions as well as civilian goods, or urged Roosevelt to side with the Stalinian Second Front thought.

As such the urgent situations confronting him, Ambassador Litvinov should by all means have gone on the fastest and shortest line possible to America, and to Washington, D.C., at that, and being enthralled in the diplomatic service to save Stalin and his homelands; alas, as the facts testify or betray he had come across the Pacific route, by means of the Pan American China Clipper flying boat, boarding in on one at Hong Kong, spending at least one solid day and night at the island of Oahu,²⁷⁾ before going on to the American mainland and to the capitol city.

One might have argued at the time that European fronts had been all effectively sealed by the Germans, and a man of Litvinov status could not possibly have risked such the route. Though seems a bit reasonable sounding, this will not do. For, during the same critical period, Roosevelt's special envoy Harry Hopkins with his sickly body had flown direct over the North Seas, having braved the coldest weather and the *Luftwaffe* threats, by means of a lumbering RAF's Catalina flying boat!²⁸⁾ As such had been the case, the hitherto hidden wisdom for his seemingly peace-time and tycoonlike itinerary that had taken him clear across the three great continents and one fullscale ocean, be re-examined under new spotlights. More specifically pointing, the very fact that the man whose presence and service had been most urgently sought in Washington should have come to Hawaii at all be considered.

His visit to Hawaii should have concealed a certain ulterior motive is another slab of the stepping stones that would lead one to a joint-venture hypothesis between Stalin and Roosevelt.

Surprising as it may sound, the presence in Hawaii of Ambassador Litvinov on the early December days of 1941 had been a piece of newspaper items that had been never classified.²⁹⁾ In fact, it had been right under our nose, just like "The Purloined Letter," by Edgar Allan Poe.

Indeed, on the 3rd of December, 1941, Dr. Motoichi Moori, an American citizen of the Japanese ancestry, had exchanged long distance telephone conversations with Vice Director Ogawa of the Newspaper *Yomiuri* in Tokyo. Answering for the said Ogawa's question that had asked for any interesting recent development in Hawaii, Dr. Moori had replied as follows; yesterday Russian Ambassador Litvinov came; not a word was obtained

from him. It seems that he's been under the strict Governmental order, to keep his mouth shut....

Somewhat a surprise to us, the entire exchanges were appeared on the *Yomiuri* paper on a day before the PHA in Tokyo.

Aside from this, there had occurred another development by way of Russia; that was the arrival of a Russian liner *Lurline*³⁰⁾ on the same December 3rd; the fact had been duly relayed by T. Yoshikawa, Japanese Navy's secret agent in Hawaii, to Tokyo and the General Staff of the IJN at that, by means of the *coded* diplomatic telegrams (alas, their contents had been all picked up by the cryptoanalysts in Washington).

Now, several days afterwards, in Hawaii, somewhat more strange and far uncanny had been occurring; to be exact, it developped on the 6th of December of Hawaiian date (or the American Date).

Inasmuch as the order of the facts surrounding the day would reveal, this day of the 6th of December, 1941, is the day before the fateful 7th, thus one day prior to the PHA, and preceded further by the 5th on which the Nagumo Task Force had been clearly sighted by the said Russian ship!

It was amidst the above-mentioned context of events and dates that one should reconsider the following happenings. For there seems to have been ample evidences that on that day of the American sixth a strange order had been reported issuing, instructing the defense forces on the Hawaiian Islands slacken on the outer defenses, but concentrate on the internal defenses, *i.e.*, the vigilance against subversive guerrilla warfare by the Japanese descendants.

It was due to this untimely order that on the very next day the Hawaiian bases had been made literally sitting ducks to the Japanese onslaughts. Just who in the final analysis had been the real authority which had issued such the order was the muddled issue the exact nature of which is still waiting clarifications; but one of the real on-the-spot persons during that critical time, John A. Burns³¹⁾ had declared in his testamentary tape recordings that the C-in-C of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Kimmel and General Short of the Army had been made scapegoats, and that the men to whom the very Infamy be tagged should be definitely someone else, higher up.

The Japanese novelist Jo Toyoda, himself an ex-naval flyer, infers³²⁾ the man in question could have been President Roosevelt. Had this been true, the very natural question to be asked is once again the reasons why he had had to resort to such the drastic measures, as they had been dealt in the foregoing pages. Toyoda is arguing that President Roosevelt had taken such the drastic means so as to drive the unwilling Americans to the war against the Axis nations. This, however, can hardly be new illumination to those of us that have been showered with the so-called revisionists' views on the so-called PHA conspiracy from the American side.

The wirtter of this research paper thinks otherwise; in fact, he believes he could

hardly be conquered to such the views, when considering the very person and personality make up of the late President Roosevelt, especially with reference to the fore-mentioned psycho hysterises of him. Moreover, President Roosevelt happens to have experienced the vice ministership for Navy Department, essentially the same post occupied by his opponent Admiral Yamamoto. Just as Yamamoto's love of his homeland and the IJN is genuine, so must have been the late President Roosevelt's. And though the writer did mention that both Roosevelt and his military leaders had taken awesome and ample lessons from the Churchillian Coventry decisions, that does not automatically prove the sacrifice theory, nor to the contrary, by the President and his military associates, of the beloved Pacific Fleet, together with thousands of American lives.

What had most probably occurred was both President Roosevelt and his military leaders as well as FBI's had taken far tighter security measures over the code secrecy, especially on the matters of the Japanese ciphers and code machines; indeed, long before the PHA, pains had been taken to prevent at any cost the leakage of the Anglo-American success in breaking the Japanese diplomatic code secrecy, the very knowledge obtained from the duplicated code machines, termed by the Americans as the *Magic* or *Purple* machines.

But the extent to which President Roosevelt and his military leaders had been applying the Churchillian Coventry lessons, should have ended right there; and thenceforth they should have been far more heeding to the still another Churchillian lessons at Taranto; alas, if the saying by William Stevenson about Tricycle (the name of the Allied spy³³⁾) had been all true, the warnings had all fallen on the deaf ears.

In consequence, they had come to sacrifice the fate of the entire Pacific Fleet upon the matter of code secrecy.

The proposed counter attack by the Americans had come to naught, because of the absence of the expected Russian vessels' sighting report?

What had most probably occurred might have been the drawing up by President Roosevelt and possibly Admiral Stark of positive counter measures to check the Japanese onslaught before it could fall on the uninformed and unsuspecting Hawaiian bases; but it so miserably failed, not because the Americans lacked either courage or resources, but because they had put absolute trust on the Russian vessels to report of their sightings in time. The present-day retrospection of wise-after-the-event nature would deny the above assumption. But what had faced the Roosevelt Administration is essentially the same agonizing issue that had faced Churchill on Coventry; that is, how to effect the possible counter measure, without divulging or leaking even a bit of advance information of the oncoming attack. When considering on the leakage point, the Islands of Hawaii had presented indeed far serious and difficult cases, compared to the all-British Coventry.

When we think of a large portion of the Japanese-blooded American citizens, not to speak of many diehard first generation Japanese, the problems the authorities had been facing must have been difficult ones. Under such the circumstances, the very meaning of the recurrent warnings from Washington that attended to the anti-air maneuvers, those exercises be carried out in a manner not to arouse or alarm the citizens, is now more than understandable. In a word, Washington had been bent on every effort, neither to alarm nor arouse the Japanese agents operating on the Islands of Hawaii.

Under such the circumstances, to ask the Russians for a help seemed certainly ideal at the time, the time when Americans had been so naive to the Russians as to their treacherous diplomacy. As the results, the use of the non-aggression pact and that of neutrality between Japan and Russia could have been taken up as a handy shield to cover up the US Navy's partial readiness to counter, not to speak of the Army Air Force with their flying fortresses. If the war with Japan is inevitable, as Stimson, Stark and Roosevelt had all agreed upon, what had Admiral Yamamoto thought of, or to give one crippling blow upon the enemy's first-line force at the very beginning of hostilities might have, and should have occurred to those Roosevelt administrators; had this been the case, Stalin's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary Litvinov's mission would have experienced little trouble in selling their ideas to those eagerly waiting Americans.

For its clarification' sake, the writer of this article would like to repeat that the encounter of the Nagumo Striking Force in the Northern Waters off Hawaii had occurred on the 5th of December, American time, of 1941, and that the said Russian ship had never uttered any radio signal that seemed to have been taken for a contact report; and the very next day (according to the former police officer, three-time governor of the post-war Hawaii, John A Burns's testamentary tape recordings), the disastrous directive that had come to instruct the Hawaiian commanders to let the outwardly vigilance down, while concentrating on the subversive actions from within, had been issued.

For all of these, the said Ambassador Litvinov not only remained in his post impregnable, but his politico-diplomatic stature seemed to have grown until he had become known as a tough Russian delegate at the UN. And in his memoirs, he tells of his boarding a Pan American China Clipper flying boat at Hong Kong, and arriving—via Hawaii—at Washington, on the wake of the PHA, but tactfully refraining from any commenting on his Hawaiian itinerary. Though the severity of the circumstances surrounding him somewhat inferable, Mr. Litvinov for all his participations on the pre-Pearl diplomacy, had kept his lips tight on the PHA to his very end, the fact is a little more than impressive.

Ultra Secret Activities by Dr. Richard Sorge, the Spy Tycoon in Tokyo

For all the above arguments, the question can be raised from still skeptical quarters to the effect that on what guarantees or evidences the late President Roosevelt and his

American military leaders had given themselves up so easily, or had been conquered to the Russian invitation so willingly? A logical assumption that the writer of this article is offering is the existence of the favorable experiences of Mr. Roosevelt in the prior dealings with the Russians; especially from Stalin and his associates some vital informations concerning the IJN of extremely high degrees must have been supplied, before the PHA.

Part of what Sorge had accomplished in the execution of the just mentioned, are as follows:

(1) Having learned of the PHA design by the IJN, he had informed it to Stalin, at least sixty days before the attack.

(2) For this extraordinary tip-off, Stalin had given him the highest words of praise and thanks.

(3) The very PHA plan or design had been passed to President Roosevelt and his cabinet members, including top military leaders, naturally long before the PHA, via Stalin.

(4) Words of grateful confirmation and necessary counter measures had been taken came forth from Roosevelt.

Inasmuch as there is the lapse of some seven months, since Washington had been first informed of the brewing PHA design from American Ambassador in Tokyo Joseph Grew on January 27, 1941 to the above-mentioned Sorge report's being relayed to Washington via Stalin, sometime in September of 1941, the information contents on the Sorge report must have exceeded in both bits and quality thereof, thus having far more convincing power.

The arrest of Dr. Sorge by *Tokko* (or the Special Police Agency whose utmost duty was the vigilance over subversion and espionage) had taken place before the PHA, but his astonishing reveals or confessions were to come after the success of the PHA.

It should be understood that the above mentioned bits of information are those mentioned in Rear Admiral Theobald's *Final Secret of Pearl Harbor*, and they in turn seem to have come from John O'Donnell's signed article which appeared on the May 17th issue of the *New York Daily News*, 1951. O'Donnell himself declares that he had seen the original text by Sorge of these confessions as mentioned in the foregoing statement.

Even yet one cannot help asking why the master spy Sorge, the man of iron will, had cracked; not only did he succumb to the police interrogations but also confess to the length to the very prosecutors so as to incriminate himself at the end as the 20th Century's greatest spy tycoon.

The only possible reason why he had gone to such the extent and extreme to make the PHA implications (including the top-level involvements with Premier Stalin and President Roosevelt) known to the Japanese authorities is, in the writer's opinion, Sorge's

last but not least bid for his own life. By the very tokens of his thorough thorough confessions and unmasking of his own identity, he had tried to press and impress upon his captors of his *greatness*; in fact, he had been reported saying, he could and should do great services to Japan when in crises.³⁷⁾

Moreover, he had been counting on both Stalin and his long-time comrade Rossovsky,³⁸⁾ the Sorge's former colleague during the Shanghai conspiracy days, now promoted to the rank of vice minister for foreign affairs, to intervene and ultimately save him. Alas, the man in Stalin's mind knew far too much to live; the Sorge's expected intervention never came forth from the Stalinist quarters. Instead, the Russian Embassy in Tokyo had flatly denied having any relation with him, and this attitude lasted well after the cessation of WW II. In fact, the Russian delegates at the Tokyo International Tribunal Court had kept on denying their even minimal³⁹⁾ relation with the said Sorge.

For all this, however, some thirty years afterwards, the same Richard Sorge had been made a semi-national hero by Kremlin themselves, his stern face now walked into Russian stamps, thus contradicting or compromising their former testimonies about Sorge. It should be recalled that it was well after that Khurshev's open attack on the Stalin and his worship and the so-called ice-breaking phenomena in the post-Stalinian Soviet that Kremlin had finally come to acknowledge the existence of the great spymaster Sorge and his episonage activities as great contributory services to the Russian cause.

The fact that Kremlin had attached certain amending words (for various and sundry reasons we had been unable to tell) to the late disclosure of Sorge and his activities alone betrays that during the heights of the Stalinism Sorge had been made a *persona non grata*, for all his genuine sacrifices and contributions to Kremlin and Russian people.

(To be continued)

Notes

- 1) William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (London: Sphere Books, 1977), pp. 184-189.
- 2) Frederick Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974)
- 3) W. Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 185
- 4) Capping T tactics=The tactics used by Admiral Togo at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, or the capping or blocking the oncoming enemy fleet lined up in the vertical leg of the letter T, by the horizontally lined friendly forces spread out in the horizontal bar of the same letter T which would give the entire force's full broadsides against the enemy force that could anser with only few shots at a time.
- 5) John D. Potter, *Admiral of The Pacific* (London: Heinemann, 1965), pp. 53-54.
- 6) Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1944). The entry on the 27th of January, 1941.
- 7) Hiroyuki Agawa, *The Reluctant Admiral* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979), p. 221.
J. D. Potter, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.
- 8) Frederick Sanborn, *Design For War* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951), p. 534.
- 9) Charles Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of The War, 1941* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948)
- 10) Charles Tansill, *Backdoor To War, 1933-1941* (New York: Henry Regnery, 1952)
- 11) Frederick Sanborn, *op. cit.*

- 12) Rear Admiral R. Theobald, *The Final Secret Of Pearl Harbor* (Devin-Adair, 1954)
- 13) W. Stevenson, *op. cit.*
- 14) F. Winterbotham, *op. cit.*
- 15) Walter Lord, *Day of Infamy* (New York: Bantam Books, 1958), p. 184.
- 16) *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- 17) Jo Toyoda, *Nami-makura-ikutabi-zo*=How many nights did he spend, pillowing the ocean waves?
(Tokyo: Kodansha, 1973), pp. 62–64., pp. 73–74.
- 18) *Ibid.*, p. 73.
- 19) *Ibid.*, pp. 74–75.
- 20) *Ibid.*, p. 73
- 21) Paul Carell, *Unternehmen Barbarossa*, (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1963), pp. 50, 125, 154, 276.
- 22) T. Obi (ed.), *Zorge-fiken* (Tokyo: Misuzu, 1962), p. 32.
- 23) Hiroyuki Agawa, *op. cit.*, p. 220.
- 24) *Ibid.*, p. 280.
- 25) W. Lord, *op. cit.*, p. 200.
- 26) F. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 331–332.
- 27) Minoru Omori, *Roosevelt* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978), pp. 240–241.
- 28) Minoru Omori, *Churchill* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1976), pp. 298–299. The date was July 28, 1941.
- 29) *The Yomiuri*, Dec. 7th, 19541 (Japanese edition)
- 30) David Kahn, *Codebreakers* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 47.
- 31) *The Honolulu Advertiser*, Oct., 20th, 1976.
- 32) J. Toyoda, *Moeru-Doto or the Burning, Angry Waves* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978), pp. 362–367.
- 33) W. Stevenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 278–277.
- 34) F. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 440–441.
- 35) *Ibid.*
- 36) H. Agawa, *op. cit.*, pp. 86, 264.
- 37) T. Obi (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 549.
- 38) *Ibid.*, P. 170, pp. 548–549.
- 39) *Ibid.*, pp. 550–552.

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